Time for Israel and America to End Their Policy of Restraint
By Bernard J. Shapiro
He who is merciful when he should be cruel will in the end be cruel when he should be merciful.
--Midrash Samuel (Jewish rabbinic text from early Middle Ages)
From the very early days of the Haganah and continuing with the emerging Israel Defense Forces (IDF), there was a policy of self-restraint or havlagah. This policy mandated that defenders could only return fire, hold their positions, and never to engage in counter-terror. This policy was based on the false premise that the Arab masses did not support the war against the Yishuv (the Jewish population before independence) and then the State of Israel and would be brought into the conflict if Israeli forces were too aggressive. There were some good and practical reasons for restraint in the early days. There was legitimate f! ear that the British would cut off immigration if the Jews were to go on the offensive against the Arabs. Havlagah was essentially a Haganah (Labor/Socialist) policy and many supporters of Jabotinsky\'s Revisionist Zionist movement broke off from them to form fighting units (Irgun Zvai Leumi and Stern) unrestrained by that policy.
The modern IDF was dominated by Labor and quickly adopted the policy of restraint and the concept of "purity of arms" as its official doctrine. The later reinforced the former by adding that a soldier should never have to obey an illegal order to commit some atrocity. The enemy, including prisoners of war, should be treated with dignity and civilian populations should be spared as much harm as possible, even if this causes greater Israeli casualties. There was some flexibility in this strict moral code.
This policy of restraint may have been practical during the pre-state days and even during the! early years of Israeli independence. These periods were characterized by weakness and relative dependence on foreign goodwill. Following the Six Day War in 1967, the need for havlagah decreased and the damage it caused began to become more evident. Israel became the preeminent power in the Middle East, yet failed to grasp the strategic opportunities that came with such dominance. Here are some of the historical highlights of the failed policy of restraint:
1. Following the Six Day War (1967) and the capture of Jerusalem, Moshe Dayan turned over control of Judaism\'s most sacred place, the Temple Mount, to Moslem authorities. He did it to appease their sensibilities to the Israeli capture of the city. Jewish rights were ignored to please the defeated Arabs, who had plotted our destruction. Dayan also prevented a mass exodus of Arabs from YESHA, which ultimately led to the problems we face today.
2. During the War of Attrition with Egypt (1969-70), the Israeli forces adopted primarily a defensive posture. They built a system of bunkers (The Bar Lev Line) along the Suez Canal. Israeli soldiers were heavily pounded daily by Egyptian artillery. Finally they began to use aircraft to strike targets deep into Egypt. The policy of restraint kept them from striking anything but military and minor economic targets. Israeli soldiers died because the government was inhibited from causing Egypt \'real\' pain.
3. The Yom Kippur War of 1973 is a classic example of restraint run amok. Israeli military intelligence did not fail to recognize the approaching danger as has been the common account. In fact, Israel\'s leaders made the political decision not to utilize the great power of the IDF to crush the Egyptian and Syrian armies that they KNEW were planning to attack. Thousands of Israeli soldiers died needlessly.
4. The Camp David Accord with Egypt was another example of the failure to exert Israeli power. The oil fields of Sinai would have given Israel economic independence from America. The cost of redeployment from Sinai placed Israel in almost permanent debt to American diplomacy (often pro-Arab). Did Israel achieve anything worthwhile at Camp David? I think not and believe history will bear me out. Egypt has become one of the most ant-Semitic and hostile Arab countries in the world. As a result of Camp David, the Egyptian army now threatens Israel, having been equipped with the most modern American weapons.
5. During the War in Lebanon (1982), the IDF reached Beirut and then failed to complete the destruction of the PLO. Our enemies were allowed to escape and prepare to fight another day. Why didn\'t the Israeli Navy sink the ships loaded with PLO troops (including Arafat) as they fled Beirut? RESTRAINT!
6. In 1987 the intifada began and the Israeli forces showed great restraint and thus were incapable of crushing it. Of course, Israel received no credit in the Western media for such restraint. The failure to defeat this uprising began a process of demoralization among the Israeli population.
7. The Persian Gulf War (1991) and the SCUD attacks on Israel led to further demoralization. The failure to adequately respond to Iraq\'s aggression and the humiliating sealed rooms, led to a rapid decline in Israeli morale and desire to defend itself. More and more Israelis began to feel impotent, weak and fatigued with the continuous battle for survival. The Oslo Accords were the logical outcome of this depression and feeling that they could not sustain the struggle.
8. The Oslo Accords (1993) were the ultimate failure of the policy of restraint. Israel like America actually was very powerful. The IDF was unequaled in the Middle East while the US was the most powerful nation in the world.! Yet despite this power, Israel\'s leaders, were ready to grant equal status to a band of murderers and ultimately create a state of "Palestine" which would challenge its right to the Land and its capital of Jerusalem.
9. Israeli forces in Lebanon should have been given a free hand to "punish" all those who facilitate attacks on them including Syria, Lebanon, and Iran. There should be no more agreements that tie Israeli hands.
The damage caused by havlagah (restraint) has been immense and it far past time to reverse that policy. Americans have been viciously attacked in Africa, Yeman, and Saudi Arabia. The attempt to try to criminalize terrorism has been a dreadful mistake. Terrorism is sponsored by states who allow their territory and funds to help the organization of terrorist. The Oslo agreement allowed Arafat to set up terrorist headquarters near Israel\'s heartland. From there he sent terrorists to attack Israel. With plausible deniability he claims "he is not responsible."
Dr. Aaron Lerner of the Independent Media Review & Analysis in Israel reports that Palestinians are celebrating attacks against USA across the West Bank Israel Radio reported this afternoon that young Palestinians across the West Bank are celebrating the terrorist attacks against the USA - waving Palestinian flags and handing out candy. There are reports of shooting in some places but it is not clear if it is Palestinian police trying to clear streets of celebrants or Palestinians shooting in the air.The largest crowd, according to Israel Radio, is in the Balata refugee camp.
The American State Department policy of equating terrorist and defender equally must stop. This kind of moral equivalency allows the terrorist to believe he can do no wrong.
Both America and Israel must massively and disproportionately retaliate for terrorist attacks. The murderers of Americans and Israelis must be stopped. It is not impossible but it will be a long and difficult battle.
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Analysis: Israel Opts for Restraint in Face of Lebanese Provocation
By Yaakov Lappin
17 December, 2013
In today’s increasingly volatile region, incidents like the shooting death of an IDF soldier have the potential to spark a wider escalation.
IDF troops on duty near Rosh Hanikra Photo: Reuters
All indications are that the gunman who shot and killed an IDF soldier on the Lebanon border Sunday night, without any provocation or cause, was a Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) member who acted alone.
Urgent questions remain unanswered: Why did the LAF soldier pull the trigger? If he was indeed a rogue attacker, how will the LAF deal with him? And why did the IDF allow St.-Sgt. Maj. Shlomi Cohen, 31, to travel alone near the border in an unarmored vehicle at night? As the IDF investigates, the incident will serve as a reminder that the Lebanese border, usually calm and stable since the ceasefire that ended the 2006 Second Lebanon War, can still produce sudden outbursts of deadly violence at any time.
In today’s increasingly volatile region, such incidents have the potential to spark a wider escalation, one that could see Hezbollah and the IDF begin to trade blows. In fact, senior IDF commanders are seeing large-scale preparations by Hezbollah for its next clash with Israel.
The IDF too is readying itself.
Counteracting the explosive risks are stabilizing factors.
First among them is Israeli deterrence, which remains in place, based on the enemy’s understanding of the devastating firepower the IDF can employ. To bolster this deterrence, IDF units on the northern border have been given enough flexibility to respond immediately and forcefully to attacks against them.
Additionally, the IDF’s methodical decision-making process, based on a careful assessment of the situation, helps prevent knee-jerk reactions.
That Hezbollah remains neckdeep in sectarian Shi’ite-Sunni fighting in Syria and faces growing numbers of attacks on its home court of Lebanon suggest it stands little to gain from opening up a second front against Israel.
Therefore, its involvement in Sunday’s incident appears unlikely.
For these reasons, the IDF chose to respond with restraint. (The shots fired by IDF soldiers soon after the initial shooting were in response to suspicious border activity and did not constitute retaliation.) The restraint is a reflection of the fact that it is not in either side’s interest to escalate. This is especially true for the LAF, which, militarily speaking, is weak and would stand to lose a great deal in any clash with Israel.
Another stabilizing factor lies in the regular meetings by IDF officials with the LAF, as well as with representatives of the UN Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL) to discuss border security. The talks are aimed at trying to prevent unnecessary developments.
The security dialogue will now enable the IDF to demand firm answers from the Lebanese military and, no less importantly, to deliver a clear warning that any repeat will jeopardize the border’s stability in the future.