Published by the Freeman Center For Strategic Studies
VOLUME 17             B"H   June 2009             NUMBER 6

"For Zion's sake I will not hold My peace, And for Jerusalem's sake I will not rest"

June 2009



  • OBAMA'S LOSING STREAK AND US ..............Caroline Glick

  • FACING IRANíS ONGOING NUCLEARIZATION ..............Louis René Beres

  • ISRAEL'S RARE OPPORTUNITY ..............Caroline Glick

  • BARACK OBAMA VS INTERNATIONAL LAW ..............Caroline Glick


    THE MACCABEAN ONLINE [ISSN 1087-9404] Edited by Bernard J. Shapiro
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    By Bernard J. Shapiro

    (Revised from original editorial of August 2004)


    1. Crush terrorism and pre-empt all existential threats to the State of Israel. Why move to a country unable to protect its Jewish population?
    2. Annex all state lands within the borders of Israel (post 1967). Annex all property stolen from the Jewish People during the last 2000 years, including Church and Waqf property (exceptions, of course for Holy Places. The term Holy Places does not include fraudulent claims of Muslims to Jewish or Christian Holy Places.). Remove all illegal Arab buildings and farms.
    3. Require all voting citizens of Israel to do military or community service for 3 years (including Arabs). The right to vote and be a citizen will depend such service + a loyalty oath to the Jewish State.
    4. Re-affirm that Israel is a Jewish State and NOT a democratic (one man one vote) state of all its citizens. The loyal citizens of Israel whether Jewish, Christian, Druze, Bedouin or Arab will have equal rights.
    5. Adopt Prof. Paul Eidelberg's constitution with constituency elections.
    6. Open up Judea & Samaria for massive building, thus creating giant suburbs close to the heavily populated Israeli coastline. A system of toll roads, and light rail will connect these suburbs to the coast from Ashdod to Nahariya. This will solve the over population along Israel's coast and create a better quality of living for all Israelis.
    7. Anyone in Israel who raises up a rock to crush Jewish skulls, or a knife, gun or bomb to kill Jews should be expelled from Eretz Yisrael. Those not loyal to the State of Israel as a Jewish State and wish to replace it with an Arab/Muslim country, should lose all citizenship rights and be encouraged to leave. If they incite hatred and anti-Jewish feelings, they should be expelled.
    A final thought: It took Jews 2000 years to regain Eretz Yisrael. We should most emphatically not allow the world who wished us dead to influence our decisions on how we should LIVE.



    Our World: Obama's losing streak and us

    Jun. 15, 2009
    Caroline Glick , THE JERUSALEM POST


    Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's speech Sunday evening at Bar-Ilan University had one goal: To get US President Barack Obama off of Israel's back.
    Netanyahu's speech was an eloquent, rational and at times impassioned defense of Israel. For Israeli ears, after years of former prime minister Ehud Olmert's and former foreign minister Tzipi Livni's continuous assaults on Israeli rights, and their strident defenses of capitulation to the Palestinians and the Syrians, Netanyahu's address was a breath of fresh air. But it is hard to see how it could have possibly had any lasting impact on Obama or his advisers.
    To be moved by rational argument, a person has to be open to rational discourse. And what we have witnessed over the past week with the Obama administration's reactions to both North Korea's nuclear brinksmanship and Iran's sham elections is that its foreign policy is not informed by rationality but by the president's morally relative, post-modern ideology. In this anti-intellectual and anti-rational climate, Netanyahu's speech has little chance of making a lasting impact on the White House.
    If rational thought was the basis for the administration's policymaking on foreign affairs, North Korea's decisions to test long range ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, send two US citizens to long prison terms and then threaten nuclear war should have made the administration reconsider its current policy of seeking the approval and assistance of North Korea's primary enabler - China - for any action it takes against Pyongyang. As Nicholas Eberstadt suggested in Friday's Wall Street Journal, rather than spending its time passing UN Security Council resolutions with no enforcement mechanisms against North Korea, the administration would be working with a coalition of the willing to adopt measures aimed at lowering the threat North Korea constitutes to regional, US and global security through its nuclear and ballistic missile programs and its proliferation activities.
    But the administration has done no such thing. Instead of working with and strengthening its allies, it has opted to work with North Korea's allies China and Russia to forge a Security Council resolution harsh enough to convince North Korean leader Kim Jung Il to threaten nuclear war, but too weak to degrade his capacity to wage one.
    Similar to Obama's refusal to reassess his failed policy regarding North Korea, his nonreaction to the fraudulent Iranian election shows that he will not allow facts to interfere with his slavish devotion to his ideological canon that claims that no enemy is unappeasable and no ally deserves automatic support. Far from standing with the democratic dissidents now risking their lives to oppose Iran's sham democracy, the administration has reportedly expressed concern that the current postelection protests will destabilize the regime.
    Obama has also refused to reconsider his decision to reach a grand bargain with the ayatollahs on Iran's nuclear weapons program that would serve to legitimize their continued grip on power. His refusal to make a moral distinction between the mullahs and their democratic opponents - like his refusal in Cairo to make a moral distinction between a nuclear-armed Iran and a nuclear-armed America - makes clear that he is not interested in forging a factually accurate or morally clear-sighted foreign policy.
    ALL OF THIS brings us back to Israel - and Netanyahu's speech about the nature and causes of the Palestinian conflict and the conditions that must be met if peace is ever to be achieved. His address aimed in two ways to lower US pressure while averting an open confrontation with a president whose approval ratings remain above 60 percent. First, Netanyahu demonstrated that through their consistent rejection of Israel's right to exist as the Jewish state, the Palestinians - not us - are the side responsible for the absence of Middle East peace.
    Second, he tried to decrease US pressure on his government by conditionally accepting the idea of a Palestinian state. Clearly, it was Netanyahu's acceptance of the idea of a Palestinian state - albeit a demilitarized one - that was supposed to do the most to fend off US pressure. After all, Obama and his advisers have made the swift establishment of a Palestinian state their primary foreign policy aim.
    Irrespective of its impact on the Obama administration, Netanyahu's speech was a positive contribution to the general discourse on the Middle East and Israel's place in it. He made good use of his opportunity to address the nation above the heads of the uniformly leftist media to forge a new definition of the national consensus. Whereas his defeatist predecessors consistently spoke of the people's willingness to make painful concessions for peace, and treated the establishment of a Jew-free Palestinian state as their primary duty as Zionists, Netanyahu recast the national consensus along patriotic lines.
    He echoed the sentiments of the vast majority of Israelis when he refused to end building inside of Jewish communities located beyond the 1949 armistice lines; when he asserted that he would make no concessions on sovereignty over Jerusalem; would insist that we retain defensible borders; would refuse entrance of so-called Palestinian refugees to our territory; and demanded Palestinian recognition of our right to exist as the Jewish state.
    He stridently and eloquently corrected Obama's false characterization of this country as the product of the Holocaust during his speeches at Cairo and Buchenwald by recalling the 3,500 year old Jewish ties to the Land of Israel. And he made clear that the association Obama made between the Holocaust and this country's founding was a precise inversion of the historical record. It is not Israel that owes its existence to the Holocaust. Rather, the Holocaust was only able to happen because there was no Israel.
    NETANYAHU'S SPEECH was a much-needed strong defense. But it was not a perfect defense. It suffered from two flaws that may come back to haunt the premier in the years to come. First, his demand that the US lead the international community in guaranteeing that the Palestinian state is demilitarized provided the Obama administration with a new means to trick Israel into making suicidal concessions.
    The only way to ensure that a Palestinian state is demilitarized is to send in forces to demilitarize it. Obviously the Americans won't take such a step. In Gaza, a militarized Palestinian state already exists and the Americans have no intention of demilitarizing it for us. As for Judea and Samaria, today, the only thing the emerging Palestinian state has to show for itself is its US-built army.
    The only force that would ensure a Palestinian state (or states) stays demilitarized is the IDF. But by appointing the US the guarantor of its demilitarized status, Netanyahu is inviting the US to lie and so make it impossible for us to take the steps necessary to ensure that the Palestinians lack the means to threaten the country.
    In requesting that the US guarantee disarmament, Netanyahu repeated a mistake he made in his first term in office. In 1996 he conditioned his willingness to move forward with peace talks with the PLO on the terror group's amendment of its charter calling for the destruction of Israel in line with its commitment under the initial Oslo agreement. Netanyahu empowered Bill Clinton to judge Palestinian compliance with this demand. In due course, Clinton travelled to Gaza and mendaciously announced that the PLO had in fact amended the charter. No such action had been taken, but Netanyahu was in no position to accuse Clinton of lying.
    While his decision to appoint Obama arbiter of Palestinian demilitarization was ill-conceived, things could have been much worse.
    Netanyahu ignored the so-called road map peace plan. That plan is one long list of Palestinian commitments that the US is empowered to judge compliance on. From terror fighting to ending incitement, the road map places Israel in the position of being forced to take America's word on issues paramount to its national security. By ignoring the road map, Netanyahu managed to avert the need to call Obama a liar directly.
    The other problem with Netanyahu's speech is that by accepting the idea of a Palestinian state, and embracing Obama's fantasy that it is possible to reach a deal with the Palestinian Authority, Netanyahu blocked the possibility that Israel will be able to forge a new policy that will move it to a more advantageous status quo in the coming years. That is, Netanyahu's conditional acceptance of Obama's false and ideologically motivated two-state paradigm damns Israel to the position of foot dragger in relation to someone else's policy rather than trailblazer for its own policy.
    In fairness to Netanyahu, in light of Obama's ideological commitment to the two-state paradigm which blames Israel for the absence of peace, it is far from clear that he has any choice other than to go along with the president and just play for time. Were Netanyahu to apply Israeli law to the large settlement blocs and the Jordan Valley or establish security zones along Gaza's borders with Israel and Egypt, he would likely instigate a full breach of relations with Washington.
    At this point, it is up to the public and our representatives in the Knesset to pave the way for a better policy in the future. This we can do by rejecting the two-state paradigm and conducting a public discourse relevant to our national interests. For Netanyahu, however, buying time with a hostile administration may be the best he can aspire to during his current term in office.
    Of course, buying time in and of itself is no great accomplishment. The voters did not elect Netanyahu to lead us simply to buy time. We elected him to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. If his speech succeeded in blunting US pressure on Israel - even temporarily - on the Palestinian front, and in light of the results of the Iranian presidential race, Netanyahu has gained the opportunity to act on the Iranian front. If during his current termhe prevents Iran from becoming a nuclear power and makes no concessions in Judea, Samaria, Jerusalem or the Golan Heights, he will be remembered as one of our greatest leaders and his speech will be remembered for posterity as a pivotal event.
    On the other hand, if Netanyahu sits on his laurels, he will be surprised to see how quickly Obama - desperate for a foreign policy achievement after being laughed out of Teheran and Pyongyang - forgets his happiness at his address. In no time flat, Obama will try to force Israel make him look like he knows what he is doing. At that point, an open confrontation with the White House will become unavoidable.









    As just published in International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 22, Issue 3, June 2009, pp. 491-514

    Louis René Beres

    Chair of Project Daniel

    Professor of International Law

    Department of Political Science

    Purdue University

    West Lafayette IN 47907


    The views expressed in this retrospective are those of Professor Louis René Beres, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of any other members of Project Daniel, or of any government.

    As in all complex strategic affairs, the urgent matter of Iranian nuclearization is now closely interwoven with multi-layered issues of intelligence and counterintelligence. This is especially the case for Israel, a microstate that remains fixedly in the annihilatory cross hairs of the Islamic Republic in Tehran. What follows, therefore, is a comprehensive and informed six-year retrospective and re-assessment of Project Daniel that includes, for the very first time, certain timely and pertinent intelligence concerns. While these important concerns were assuredly implicit in our initial and original formulations, I have attempted here to bring them (selectively, of course) out into the open. My hope, in this connection, is that the reader will find my determined fusion of strategy and intelligence purposeful and productive, both generically/theoretically, and in particular reference to the unique Iranian peril facing Israel.

    Iran still proceeds toward nuclear weapon status largely unencumbered. What precisely does this mean for Israel? Has Israel already run out of time?

    Six years ago, a small private group of Israeli and American strategists issued an informed and authoritative set of recommendations. We identified our effort as Project Daniel. Today, some of these recommendations, which were first made public in May 2004, may have become more problematic. Nonetheless, they are by no means less valid or less valuable. Rather, still conceptually sound, they warrant very close and continuing study, especially as there is a new prime minister in Jerusalem and a new president in Washington.

    ISRAEL'S STRATEGIC FUTURE: THE FINAL REPORT OF PROJECT DANIEL was first delivered by hand to then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon on January 16, 20031. The underlying rationale of this report had been the still-plausible presumption that Israel needs a coherent plan for dealing with particular existential threats, and that we ("The Group") were well positioned to design such a plan. We began our demanding work with an overriding concern for the possible enemy fusion of WMD-capacity (especially nuclear) with irrational adversaries. Contrary to this particular policy starting point, however, Project Daniel ultimately concluded that the primary threats to Israel's survival were actually more likely to arise among certain rational enemies. At the same time, the prospect of even singular expressions of enemy irrationality could have staggering security implications for Israel, and it must therefore remain a primary function of Israel’s Intelligence Community (IIC)2 to continuously search and monitor for pertinent evidence. From an intelligence perspective, the rationality vs. irrationality inclinations of Israel’s enemies must always be regarded as a dynamic rather than static condition.

    Throughout our work, which was not limited to Iran, The Group examined a broad variety of complex issues concerning deterrence; defense; preemption and war fighting. Combining legal with strategic analyses, we linked the jurisprudential concept of "anticipatory self-defense" to various preemption scenarios, and to The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 20, 2002). We also examined closely the prospects for expanded strategic cooperation between Washington and Jerusalem, with particular reference to maintaining Israel's "qualitative edge" and to associated issues of necessary funding. All of these difficult examinations may now need to be re-configured, more or less, to take into account the new and very different American president. In this connection, a key mission for the IIC will be to assist in giving maximum and purposeful effect to key Israeli policies of deterrence, defense, preemption and war fighting. This may mean selectively divulging certain bits of relevant information as much as (or even more than) keeping such information under wraps. For example, the credibility of Israel’s deterrence posture always rests upon enemy perceptions of both capability and intention. A critical role for IIC must then be to help convince any would-be attacker (direct attack or attack by terrorist surrogates) that Israel has both the means and the willingness to make good on its promised threats to retaliate.

    Early on, Project Daniel looked very closely at a recommended "paradigm shift" to deal with various "low intensity" and long-range WMD threats to Israel, and also considered the specific circumstances under which Israel should purposefully end its current posture of "nuclear ambiguity." Overall, The Group urged continuing constructive support to the United States-led War Against Terror (WAT)3 (at this time, it is still unclear whether President Barack Obama will actively continue this WAT, and – if so – under what precise operational conditions and contingencies), and stipulated that Israel combine a strengthening of multilayered active defenses with a credible, secure and decisive nuclear deterrent. This recognizable retaliatory (second-strike) force was then recommended to be fashioned with a reliable capacity to destroy some 10 - 20 high-value targets scattered widely over pertinent enemy states in the Middle East. This objective was entirely consistent with our explicit collective assumption that the main goal of Israel's nuclear forces must always be deterrence ex ante, not revenge ex post.

    The Group recognized a very basic asymmetry between Israel and the Arab/Iranian world concerning, inter alia, the desirability of peace; the absence of democracy; the acceptability of terror as a legitimate weapon and the overwhelming demographic advantage of the Arab/Iranian world. With this in mind, ISRAEL'S STRATEGIC FUTURE concluded that non-conventional exchanges between Israel and adversary states must always be scrupulously avoided, and that Israel should do whatever is needed to maintain its conventional supremacy in the region. Facing a growing anarchy in world affairs and an increasing isolation in the world community, Israel was strongly encouraged by Project Daniel to incorporate The Group's considered recommendations into codified IDF doctrine, and also to systematically expand Israeli strategic studies into a more disciplined field of inquiry.

    In the end, we affirmed, Israel's survival will depend largely upon strategic policies of its own making, and that these policies will be best-informed by The Group's proposed steps regarding deterrence; defense; war-fighting and preemption options. Today, with the still-steadily advancing nuclear threat from Iran, the preemption option has likely become simultaneously more compelling and operationally more difficult (See, for example, Louis René Beres and MK/Major General (IAF/Res.) Isaac Ben-Israel, “Think Anticipatory Self-Defense,” THE JERUSALEM POST, October 22, 2007, and Louis René Beres and MK/Major General (IAF/Res.) Isaac Ben-Israel, “Deterring an Iranian Nuclear Attack,” THE WASHINGTON TIMES, January 27, 2009).4



    Although The Group's collaborative analyses drew explicitly upon very contemporary strategic thinking, we were also mindful of certain much-earlier investigations of war, power and survival. One such still-relevant investigation can be found in Sun-Tzu's THE ART OF WAR.

    Sun-Tzu's THE ART OF WAR, written in the fifth century BCE, synthesized a coherent set of principles designed to produce military victory and minimize the chances of military defeat. Examined together with ISRAEL'S STRATEGIC FUTURE, the Final Report of Project Daniel, the full corpus of this work should now be studied closely by all who wish to strengthen Israel's military posture and its associated correlation of forces/order of battle. At a time when the leaders of particular Arab/Islamic states might soon combine irrationality with weapons of mass destruction, the members of Project Daniel were determined to augment current facts and figures with dialectical reasoning, intellectual imagination and analytic creativity. To be sure, these essential qualities would have to be demonstrated not only by academic and defense communities in Israel, but also by the IIC.

    Israel, we reported, must continue its "imperative to seek peace through negotiation and diplomatic processes wherever possible." Indeed, we continued: "This imperative, codified at the United Nations Charter and in multiple authoritative sources of international law, shall always remain the guiding orientation of Israel's foreign policy." What are Sun-Tzu's favored principles concerning negotiation and diplomacy? Political initiatives and agreements may be useful, he instructs, but purposeful military preparations should never be neglected. The primary objective of every state should be to weaken enemies without actually engaging in armed combat. This objective links the ideal of "complete victory" to a "strategy for planning offensives." In Chapter Four, "Military Disposition," Sun-Tzu tells his readers: "One who cannot be victorious assumes a defensive posture; one who can be victorious attacks.... Those who excel at defense bury themselves away below the lowest depths of Earth. Those who excel at offense move from above the greatest heights of Heaven."

    Project Daniel took note. Today, with steadily more menacing Iranian nuclearization, the whole world should also take note. But, to date, so-called “sanctions” have been a mere parody of corrective action. Politically, it is extremely unlikely that the new American president will take an even more serious stance on sanctions. In this connection, the IIC can play a critical role in gathering information that will authoritatively confirm both the futility of ordinary sanctions and the rapidity of Iranian nuclearization.

    Recognizing the dangers of relying too heavily upon active defenses such as anti-ballistic missile systems, a reliance whereby Israel would likely bury itself away "below the lowest depths of Earth," Project Daniel had advised that Israel take certain prompt initiatives in removing existential threats. These initiatives included striking first (preemption) against enemy WMD development, manufacturing, and storage, control and deployment centers - a recommendation fully consistent with longstanding international law regarding "anticipatory self defense" and also with the then-declared defense policy of the United States.5 Here, the IIC must necessarily play an antecedent and indispensable role in ascertaining pertinent Iranian hard target locations and associated levels (active and passive) of enemy protection. Indeed, if preemption is still to be taken seriously in Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv, this particular IIC function could ultimately be the most vital of all its information-gathering responsibilities.

    If, for any reason, the doctrine of preemption should fail to prevent an enemy Arab state or Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, the Daniel Group advised the Prime Minister that Israel cease immediately its established policy of deliberate nuclear ambiguity, and proceed at once to a position of openly-declared nuclear deterrence. Additional to this change in policy, we recommended that Israel make it perfectly clear to the enemy nuclear state that it would suffer prompt and maximum-yield nuclear "counter-value" reprisals for any level of nuclear aggression undertaken against Israel. Here, again, there would be a special responsibility for the IIC.

    Under certain circumstances, our team continued, similar forms of Israeli nuclear deterrence should be directed against enemy states that threaten existential harms with biological weapons.

    What exactly are "existential harms?" Taken literally, an existential threat implies harms that portend a complete annihilation or disappearance of the state. We had felt, however, that certain more limited forms of both conventional and unconventional attack against large Israeli civilian concentrations could also constitute an existential threat. In part, our calculation here was based upon Israel's small size, its very high population density and its particular concentrations of national infrastructure. In essence, if the present Government of Israel were to follow the expressed advice of Project Daniel, prospective aggressors would understand fully and in advance that launching certain kinds of attack against Israel would turn their own cities to vapor and ash.

    Following Sun-Tzu, the clear purpose of our recommendation was to achieve a complete Israeli "victory" without engaging in actual hostilities. In the exact words of our Report, ISRAEL'S STRATEGIC FUTURE: "The overriding priority of Israel's nuclear deterrent force must always be that it preserves the country's security without ever having to be fired against any target."

    To preserve itself against any existential threats, some of which may stem from terrorist organizations as well as from states, Israel – we reasoned - should learn from Sun-Tzu's repeated emphasis on the "unorthodox." Drawn from the conflation of thought that crystallized as Taoism, the ancient strategist observes: " battle, one engages with the orthodox and gains victory through the unorthodox." In a complex passage, Sun-Tzu discusses how the orthodox may be used in unorthodox ways, while an orthodox attack may be unorthodox when it is unexpected. Taken together with the recommendations of Project Daniel, this passage could still represent a subtle tool for Israeli operational planning, one that might usefully exploit an enemy state's or terrorist group's particular matrix of military expectations. To be sure, the IIC would have a useful role to play here as well.

    For Israel, said The Group, the "unorthodox" should be fashioned not only on the battlefield, but also before the battle. To prevent the most dangerous forms of battle, which would be expressions of all-out unconventional warfare called "counterforce" engagements, Israel should examine a number of promising strategic postures. These postures could even focus upon a reasoned shift from an image of "orthodox" rationality to one of somewhat "unorthodox" irrationality, although Project Daniel did confine itself to prescriptions for certain defensive first-strikes using conventional weapons and for certain massive counter-value (counter-city) nuclear reprisals. Arguably, as the mere formulation of a coherent and codified nuclear deterrence doctrine could run counter to any idea of unorthodox irrationality, Sun-Tzu’s prescriptions are likely more appropriate for certain conventional scenarios than for nuclear ones.

    Before Project Daniel there was the so-called “Samson Option.” Everyone who seriously studies Israeli nuclear strategy had long heard about this biblical image and idea. The Samson Option is generally thought to be a last resort strategy wherein Israel's nuclear weapons would be used not for prevention of war or even for war waging, but rather as a last spasm of vengeance against a despised enemy state that had launched massive (probably unconventional) counter-city and/or counterforce attacks against Israel. In this view, Israel's leaders, faced with national extinction, would decide that although the Jewish State could not survive, it would "die" only together with its destroyers. (For his most recent assessment of the Samson Option, see: Louis René Beres, “Israel and Samson: Biblical Lessons for Israeli Strategy in the Nuclear Age,” ISRAEL AFFAIRS, Vol. 11, No. 3, July 2005, pp. 491-503).

    How does the "Samson Option" appear to the Arab/Iranian side? Israel, it would seem, may resort to nuclear weapons, but only in reprisal, and only in response to overwhelmingly destructive first-strike attacks. Correspondingly, anything less than an overwhelmingly destructive first-strike would elicit a measured and proportionate Israeli military response. Moreover, by striking first, the Arab/Iranian enemy knows that it could have an advantage in "escalation dominance." These calculations would follow from the more or less informed enemy view that Israel will never embrace the "unorthodox" on the strategic level, that its actions will likely always be reactions, and that these reactions will always be limited.

    But what if Israel were to fine-tune its "Samson Option?" What if it did this in conjunction with certain doctrinal changes in its longstanding policy of nuclear ambiguity? By taking the bomb out of the "basement" and by indicating, simultaneously (and with appropriate IIC assistance) that its now declared nuclear weapons were not limited to existential scenarios, Israel might still go a long way to enhancing its national security. It would do this by displaying an apparent departure from perfect rationality; that is, by expressing the rationality of threatened irrationality. Whether or not such a display would be an example of "pretended irrationality" or of an authentic willingness to act irrationally would be anyone's guess, but the IIC could be especially helpful in this regard. It goes without saying that such an example of "unorthodox" behavior by Israel could actually incite enemy first-strikes in certain circumstances, or at least hasten the onset of such strikes that may already be planned, but there are ways for Israel in which Sun-Tzu's "unorthodox" could be made to appear "orthodox." Today, more than six years after completion and presentation of Project Daniel, it is time for capable scholars to explore these ways with real care and in precise operational detail.




    Israel remains, in certain critical quarters, the openly declared national and religious object of Arab/Islamic genocide. This term “genocide” is used here in the literal and jurisprudential sense – and not merely as a figure of speech. Significantly, especially in view of widespread and largely propagandistic criticism of Israel’s Gaza operation (Operation Cast Lead), no other country is in a similar predicament. For Israel, matters of alleged “proportionality” are far more complex than for other states in the Middle East that are substantially larger than an American lake (Israel is less than half the size of Lake Michigan).

    What is Israel to do? How might Israel's possible actions or inactions affect the likelihood of a regional nuclear war in the Middle East? And in what precise ways might a nuclear war actually begin between Israel and certain of its enemies? Here is some of Project Daniel’s original response:

    Israel's nuclear weapons, unacknowledged and unthreatening, exist only to prevent certain forms of enemy aggression. This deterrent force would never be used except in defensive reprisal for certain massive enemy first strikes, especially for Arab and/or Iranian attacks involving nuclear and/or biological weapons. For the time being, at least, Israel's enemies are not yet nuclear. Even if this should change, Israel's nuclear weapons could continue to reduce the risks of unconventional war only as long as the pertinent enemy states were (1) to remain rational; and (2) to remain convinced that Israel would retaliate massively if attacked with nuclear and/or certain biological weapons of mass destruction.

    But there are many complex problems to identify if a bellicose enemy state were allowed to actually acquire nuclear weapons, problems that belie the seemingly agreeable notion (derived from spurious analogies with the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Cold War) of stable nuclear deterrence. Whether for reasons of miscalculation, accident, unauthorized capacity to fire, outright irrationality or the presumed imperatives of "Jihad,"6 such a state could opt to launch a nuclear first-strike against Israel in spite of the latter's nuclear posture. Here, Israel would certainly respond, to the extent possible, with a nuclear retaliatory strike.

    Although nothing is publicly known about Israel's precise targeting doctrine, such a reprisal might surely be launched against the aggressor's capital city or against a similarly high-value urban target. There would be no assurances, in response to this sort of nuclear aggression, that Israel would limit itself to striking back against exclusively military targets or even against the particular enemy state from which the considered aggression was launched.

    What if enemy first strikes were to involve "only" chemical and/or biological weapons? Here, although never actually discussed by The Group, Israel might still launch an aptly proportionate nuclear reprisal, but this would depend largely upon Israel's calculated expectations of follow-on aggression and also on its associated determinations of comparative damage-limitation. Should Israel absorb a massive conventional first-strike, a nuclear retaliation could still not be ruled out altogether. This is especially the case if: (1) the aggressor were perceived to hold nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction in reserve; and/or (2) Israel's leaders were to believe that non-nuclear retaliations could not prevent national annihilation. Again, Project Daniel had determined early on that the threshold of existential harms must be substantially lower than wholesale physical devastation. It would appear to me, at this time, that there are no accessible logical or empirical reasons to modify this particular determination.

    Faced with imminent and existential attacks, Israel - properly taking its cue (at least in part) from THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA - could decide to preempt enemy aggression with conventional forces. Announced on September 20, 2002, this Bush-era American strategy affirms the enduring reasonableness of anticipatory self-defense under international law. If Israel were to draw upon such authoritative expressions of then-current U.S. policy, we reasoned, the targeted state's response would determine Israel's subsequent moves. If this response were in any way nuclear, Israel would assuredly undertake nuclear counter-retaliation. If this enemy retaliation were to involve certain chemical and/or biological weapons, Israel might also determine to take a quantum escalatory initiative. Escalation dominance would be important. It could be absolutely vital to Israel’s security in the midst of certain strategic crises.

    If an enemy state's response to an Israeli preemption were limited to hard-target conventional strikes, it is highly improbable that Israel would resort to nuclear counter-retaliation. On the other hand, said The Group, if the enemy state's conventional retaliation (or any first strike) were an all-out attack directed toward Israel's civilian populations as well as to Israeli military targets - an existential strike, for all intents and purposes - an Israeli nuclear counter-retaliation could not be ruled out. Although never discussed per se by The Group, such a counter-retaliation – it is evident to me - could be ruled out only if the enemy state's conventional retaliations were: (a) entirely proportionate to Israel's preemption; (b) confined entirely to Israeli military targets; (c) circumscribed by the legal limits of "military necessity"; and (d) accompanied by explicit and verifiable assurances of no further escalation.

    It is exceedingly unlikely but certainly not inconceivable, that Israel could decide at some point to preempt enemy state aggression with a defensive nuclear strike. While circumstances could surely arise where such a defensive operation would be completely rational and also completely acceptable under international law (such a policy has been embraced by the United States in Joint Publication 3-12, DOCTRINE FOR JOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, 15 March 2005), it is improbable that Israel would ever permit itself to reach such circumstances. In our view, an Israeli nuclear preemption could be expected only if all of the following conditions were to obtain: (1) Israel's state enemies had unexpectedly acquired nuclear or other unconventional weapons presumed capable of destroying the Jewish State; (2) these enemy states had made explicit that their intentions paralleled their capabilities; (3) these states were authoritatively believed to have already begun a countdown-to-launch; and (4) Israel believed that non-nuclear preemptions could not possibly achieve the minimum needed levels of damage-limitation - that is, levels consistent with its own national survival. To assess all four of these conditions, responsibility would fall substantially upon the IIC.

    Should nuclear weapons ever be introduced into a conflict between Israel and the particular countries that wish to destroy it, some form of nuclear war fighting could ensue. This would be the case so long as: (a) enemy state first-strikes against Israel would not destroy the Jewish State's second-strike nuclear capability; (b) enemy state retaliations for Israeli conventional preemption would not destroy Israel's nuclear counter-retaliatory capability; (c) Israeli preemptive strikes would not destroy enemy state second-strike nuclear capabilities; and (d) Israeli retaliation for enemy state conventional first-strikes would not destroy enemy state nuclear counter-retaliatory capability. From the standpoint of protecting its security and survival, this meant that Israel must now take proper steps to ensure the likelihood of (a) and (b) above, and the unlikelihood of (c) and (d).

    Both Israeli nuclear and non-nuclear preemptions of enemy unconventional aggressions could lead to nuclear exchanges. This would depend, in part, upon the effectiveness and breadth of Israeli targeting, the surviving number of enemy nuclear weapons, and the willingness of enemy leaders to risk Israeli nuclear counter-retaliations. In any event, the likelihood of nuclear exchanges would obviously be greatest where potential Arab and/or Iranian aggressors were allowed to deploy ever-larger numbers of unconventional weapons without eliciting appropriate Israeli and/or American preemptions.

    Should such deployment be allowed to take place, Israel might effectively forfeit the non-nuclear preemption option. Here its only alternatives to nuclear preemption could be a no-longer viable conventional preemption or simply waiting to be attacked itself. While The Group per se did not come out in favor of a nuclear preemption even in such existentially dire circumstances, it does follow nonetheless that the risks of an Israeli nuclear preemption, of nuclear exchanges with an enemy state, and of enemy nuclear first strikes could all be reduced by certain timely Israeli and/or American non-nuclear preemptions. These preemptions would be directed at critical military targets and/or at pertinent regimes. The latter option could possibly include dedicated elimination of particular enemy leadership elites and/or certain enemy scientists.7 With regard to such clandestine actions, certain elements of the IIC could prove indispensable.



    Project Daniel examined some of the precise ways in which a nuclear war might actually begin between Israel and its enemies. From the standpoint of preventing such a war, it is essential, we reasoned, that Israel protects itself with suitable policies of preemption, defense and deterrence. This last set of policies will depend substantially upon whether Israel continues to keep its bomb in the "basement," or whether it decides to change formally from a nuclear posture of "deliberate ambiguity" to one of selected and deliberately partial disclosure. (An antecedent question asks whether nuclear weapons, disclosed or undisclosed, actually enhance Israeli security. See, for example, Louis René Beres and Zeev Maoz, a dialogue, “Israel and the Bomb,” International Security (Harvard), Vol. 29, No. 1., Summer 2004, pp. 1-4).

    In one respect, the issue is already somewhat moot. Shortly after coming to power as Prime Minister, Shimon Peres already took the then unprecedented step of openly acknowledging (in broad contours, of course) Israel's nuclear capability. Responding to press questions about the Oslo "peace process" and the probable extent of Israeli concessions, Peres remarked that he would be "delighted" to "give up the Atom" if the entire region would only embrace a comprehensive security plan. Although this remark was certainly not an intended expression of changed nuclear policy, it did raise the question of a more tangible Israeli shift away from nuclear ambiguity. Certain public remarks by previous Prime Minister Olmert – and also certain missile tests in Israel – may have had similarly shifting effects.

    Project Daniel recognized that the nuclear disclosure issue is far more than a simple "yes" or "no." Obviously, the basic question had already been answered by Peres' "offer." What still needs to be determined is the exact timing of purposeful disclosure and the extent of subtlety and detail with which Israel should actually communicate its nuclear capabilities and intentions to selected enemy states. This issue was central to the deliberations of Project Daniel, which concluded in 2003 that Israel's bomb should remain in the basement as long as possible, but also that it should be revealed in particular contours if enemy circumstances should change in an expressly ominous fashion. Once these particular contours have been determined, it will fall largely upon the IIC to bring them to the attention of pertinent enemy parties.

    Because the Project Daniel report stipulated the need for an expanded Israeli doctrine of preemption, this Project Daniel statement on nuclear ambiguity meant that Israel should promptly remove the bomb from its "basement" if - for whatever reason - Israel should have failed to exploit the recommended doctrine of preemption. Today, as Iranian nuclearization seems increasingly a fait accompli, deliberate nuclear ambiguity seems still more out-of-date. Nonetheless, this is a very subtle strategic issue that requires immediate and careful attention in capable and authoritative quarters.

    Project Daniel understood that the rationale for Israeli nuclear disclosure could never lie in expressing the obvious; that is, that Israel has the bomb. Instead, it lies in the critical understanding that nuclear weapons can serve Israel's security in a number of different ways, and that all of these ways could benefit the Jewish State to the extent that certain aspects of these weapons and associated strategies are appropriately disclosed. The pertinent form and extent of disclosure would be especially vital to Israeli nuclear deterrence, and actual execution of disclosure could fall largely upon elements of the IIC. Exactly what this particular form and extent should be has yet to be determined. It should, therefore, now be considered a question of authentically supreme importance to Israel’s strategists.

    To protect itself against enemy strikes, particularly those attacks that could carry existential costs, Project Daniel recommended that Israel exploit every component function of its nuclear arsenal. The success of Israel's efforts, we acknowledged, will depend in large measure not only upon its chosen configuration of "counterforce" (hard-target) and "counter-value" (city-busting) operations, but also upon the extent to which this configuration is made known in advance to enemy states. Before such an enemy is deterred from launching first-strikes against Israel, or before it is deterred from launching retaliatory attacks following an Israeli preemption, it may not be enough that it simply "knows" that Israel has the Bomb. It may also need to recognize that these Israeli nuclear weapons are sufficiently invulnerable to such attacks and that they are aimed at very high-value targets. Here, again, the IIC would need to play a truly fundamental role.

    In this connection, and as indicated earlier in this six-year retrospective, the Final Report of Project Daniel recommended "a recognizable retaliatory force should be fashioned with the capacity to destroy some 15 high-value targets scattered widely over pertinent enemy states in the Middle East." This "counter-value" strategy meant that Israel's second-strike response to enemy aggressions involving certain biological and/or nuclear weapons would be unambiguously directed at enemy populations, not at enemy weapons or infrastructures. Looking over the evolution of pertinent existential threats to Israel over the past six years, it seems that our original recommendation was entirely correct.

    It could appear, at first intuitive glance, that Israeli targeting of enemy military installations and troop concentrations ("counterforce targeting") would be both more compelling as a deterrent and also more humane. But it is likely, even plausible, that a nuclear-armed enemy of Israel could regard any Israeli retaliatory destruction of its armed forces as "acceptable" in certain circumstances. Such an enemy might conclude, for example, that the expected benefits of annihilating Israel would outweigh any expected retaliatory harms to its military. Here Israel's nuclear deterrent would fail, possibly with existential consequences.

    It is highly unlikely, The Group recognized, that any enemy state would ever calculate that the expected benefits of annihilating Israel would be so great as to outweigh the expected costs of its own annihilation. Excluding an irrational enemy state - a prospect that falls by definition outside the logic of nuclear deterrence – all state enemies of Israel would assuredly refrain from nuclear and/or biological attacks upon Israel that would presumptively elicit massive counter-value reprisals. Naturally, this reasoning would obtain only to the extent that these enemy states fully believed that Israel would actually make good on its threats. To the extent that the IIC could contribute to such a full belief, its role would once again involve a deliberate campaign to underscore Israeli willingness to retaliate.

    Israel's nuclear deterrent, once it were made open and appropriately explicit, would need to make clear to all prospective nuclear enemies the following: "Israel's nuclear weapons, dispersed, multiplied and hardened, are targeted upon your major cities. These weapons will never be used against these targets except in retaliation for certain WMD aggressions. Unless our population centers are struck first by nuclear attack or certain levels of biological attack or by combined nuclear/biological attack, we will not harm your cities."

    The counter-value targeting strategy recommended by Project Daniel still represents Israel's altogether best hope for avoiding a nuclear or biological war. It remains, therefore, the most humane strategy available. The Israeli alternative, an expressed counterforce targeting doctrine, would produce a markedly higher probability of nuclear or nuclear/biological war. And such a war, even if all weapons remained targeted on the other side's military forces and structures (a very optimistic assumption) would entail enormously high levels of "collateral damage." Hence, The Group correctly dismissed as purposeful any form of nuclear warfighting, and also any expressly corollary Israeli development of tactical nuclear weapons.

    The very best weapons, Clausewitz wrote, are those that achieve their objectives without ever actually being used. This is especially the case with nuclear weapons; Israel's nuclear weapons can succeed only through non-use. Recognizing this, Project Daniel made very clear in its Final Report to then Prime Minister Sharon that nuclear war fighting must always be avoided by Israel wherever possible. Nothing has happened in the past five years to in any way change this judgment.

    The Project Daniel Group recommended that Israel do whatever is necessary to prevent enemy nuclearization, up to and including pertinent acts of preemption. Should these measures fail, measures that would be permissible under international law as expressions of "anticipatory self-defense," the Jewish State should immediately end its posture of nuclear ambiguity with fully open declarations of counter-value targeting. Again, just how this imperative cessation would take precise operational shape is a question that now needs to be addressed squarely and expertly in both Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv. Also yet to be determined is precisely how the IIC might contribute purposefully to an Israeli removal of the “bomb in the basement.”



    In our fragile age of Total War, Israel must always remain fully aware of those harms that would threaten its very continuance as a state. Although the Jewish State has always recognized an overriding obligation to seek peace through negotiation and diplomacy wherever possible, there are assuredly times when its commitment to peaceful settlement will not be reciprocated. Moreover, as noted by Project Daniel, there are times when the idea of an existential threat may reasonably apply to a particular level of harms that falls below the threshold of complete national annihilation.

    Examining pertinent possibilities, The Group noted three distinct but interrelated existential threats to Israel:

    1. Biological/Nuclear (BN) threats from states;

    2. BN threats from terror organizations; and

    3. BN threats from combined efforts of states and terror organizations.

    To the extent that certain Arab states and Iran are now allowed to develop WMD capabilities, Israel may have to deal someday with an anonymous attack scenario. Here, the aggressor enemy state would not identify itself, and Israeli post-attack identification would be correspondingly difficult. What is Israel to do in such a confused and urgent crisis situation?

    The Group recommended to the former Prime Minister that "Israel must identify explicitly and early on that all enemy Arab states and Iran are subject to massive Israeli reprisal in the event of a BN attack upon Israel." We recommended further that "massive" reprisals be targeted at between 10 and 20 large enemy cities ("counter-value" targeting) and that the nuclear yields of such Israeli reprisals be in very high range. Such deterrent threats by Israel would be very compelling to all rational enemies, but - at the same time - would likely have little or no effect upon irrational ones. In the case of irrational adversaries, Israel's only hope for safety will likely lie in appropriate and operationally feasible acts of preemption.

    A policy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), which once obtained between the United States and the Soviet Union, would never work between Israel and its Arab/Iranian enemies. Rather, the Project Daniel Group recommended that Israel must prevent its enemies from acquiring BN status, and that any notion of BN "parity" between Israel and its enemies would be intolerable. Accordingly, The Group advised the Prime Minister: "Israel immediately adopt - as highest priority - a policy of preemption with respect to enemy existential threats." Such a policy would be based upon the more limited definition of "existential" described above, and would also enhance Israel's overall deterrence posture.

    Recognizing the close partnership and overlapping interests between Israel and the United States, the Project Daniel Group strongly supported the American War Against Terror (WAT). In this connection, we had urged full cooperation and mutuality between Jerusalem and Washington regarding communication of intentions. If for any reason the United States should decide against exercising preemption options against certain developing weapons of mass destruction (a decision now made decidedly more likely by the Barack Obama administration), Israel must reserve for itself the unhindered prerogative to undertake its own preemption options It should go without saying, simply from the standpoint of comparative force size alone, that the United States Air Force would have been far preferable to the Israel Air Force in undertaking any essential acts of anticipatory self-defense against Iranian nuclear assets and infrastructures. To be sure, the IAF is very capable, but it is also very small.

    The Group began its initial deliberations with the following urgent metaphor in mind: Israel could face the hazard of a suicide-bomber in macrocosm. In this scenario, an enemy Arab state or Iran would act against Israel without any ordinary regard for expected retaliatory consequences. Here, in the fashion of an individual suicide bomber who acts without fear of personal consequences - indeed, who actually welcomes the most extreme personal consequence, which is death - an enemy Arab state and/or Iran could launch WMD attacks against Israel with full knowledge and expectation of overwhelming Israeli reprisals. The conclusion to be drawn from this scenario is that Israeli deterrence vis-à-vis "suicide states" would have been immobilized by enemy irrationality, and that Israel's only recourse in such circumstances would have been appropriate forms of preemption.


    Project Daniel understood that international law has long allowed for states to initiate forceful defensive measures when there exists "imminent danger" of aggression. This rule of "anticipatory self-defense" was expanded and reinforced by President George W. Bush's issuance of THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Released on September 20, 2002, this document asserted, inter alia, that traditional concepts of deterrence would not work against an enemy "whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents...." As Israel is substantially less defensible and more vulnerable than the United States, its particular right to resort to anticipatory self-defense under threat of readily identifiable existential harms is beyond legal question.

    Following the Bush doctrine expansion of preemption (a doctrine that is soon likely to be revised toward much greater multilateralism by President Barack Obama), The Group suggested to then Prime Minister Sharon that such policy should pertain as well to certain nuclear and/or biological WMD threats against Israel, that this policy be codified as formal doctrine, and that these actions be conventional in nature. Such preemption could be overt or covert, and range from "decapitation" to full-scale military operations. Further, the Group advised that decapitation might apply to both enemy leadership elites (state and non-state) and to various categories of technical experts who would be essential to the fashioning of enemy WMD arsenals, e.g., nuclear scientists. It would. of course, fall upon certain elements of the IIC to facilitate decapitation.

    The Group reminded Prime Minister Sharon that any forcible prevention of enemy nuclear/biological deployment would be profoundly different from an Israeli preemption of an existing enemy nuclear/biological force. Attempts at preemption against an enemy that had already been allowed to go nuclear/biological could be far too risky, and could even invite an existential retaliation. It was also recommended that exclusively conventional high-precision weapons carry out any preemption, not only because they are likely to be as effective as nuclear weapons, but also because preemption with nuclear weapons could be wrongly interpreted as Israeli nuclear first strikes. If unsuccessful, these preemptive strikes could elicit an enemy's "counter-value" second strike; that is, a deadly intentional attack upon Israeli civilian populations.

    The Group advised emphatically that Israel should avoid non-conventional exchanges with enemy states wherever possible. It is still not in Israel's interest to engage these states in WMD warfare if other viable options exist. ISRAEL'S STRATEGIC FUTURE did not instruct how to "win" a war in a WMD Middle-East environment. Rather, it described what we, the members of Project Daniel, considered the necessary, realistic and optimal conditions for non-belligerence toward Israel in the region. These conditions still include a coherent and comprehensive Israeli doctrine for preemption, war fighting, deterrence and defense.

    The Group advised the then Prime Minister that there is no operational need for low-yield nuclear weapons geared to actual battlefield use. Overall, we recommended that the most efficient yield for Israeli deterrence and counterstrike purposes be a "counter-value" targeted warhead at a level sufficient to hit the aggressor's principal population centers and fully compromise that aggressor's national viability. We urged that Israel make absolutely every effort to avoid ever using nuclear weapons in support of conventional war operations. These weapons could create a seamless web of conventional and nuclear battlefields that Israel should scrupulously avoid.

    The Group considered it gainful for Israel to plan for very selective regime targeting in certain residual instances. With direct threats employed against individual enemy leaders and possible others, costs to Israel could be very much lower than alternative forms of warfare. At the same time, threats of regime targeting could be even more persuasive than threats to destroy enemy weapons and infrastructures, but only if the prospective victims were first made to feel sufficiently at risk.

    The Group advanced a final set of suggestions concerning the lawful remedy of anticipatory self-defense. Israel must be empowered with a "Long Arm" to meet its preemption objectives. This means long-range fighter aircraft with the capability to penetrate deep, heavily defended areas, and to survive. It also means air-refueling tankers; communications satellites; and long-range unmanned aerial vehicles. More generally, it continues to mean survivable precision weapons with high lethality; and also incrementally refined electronic warfare and stealth capacities.



    As indicated, The Group strongly endorsed the Prime Minister's acceptance of a broad concept of conventional preemption, but just as strongly advised against using his undisclosed nuclear arsenal for anything but essential deterrence. This means that enemy states must always understand that certain forms of aggression against Israel will assuredly elicit massive Israeli nuclear reprisals against city targets. For the moment, we still maintain that such an understanding can be communicated by Israel without any forms of explicit nuclear disclosure, but we also recognize that the presumed adequacy of nuclear ambiguity would change immediately if enemy nuclearization anywhere (Iran, of course, still comes most immediately to mind) should become a reality.

    Moreover, although both Iran and Israel’s pertinent Arab state enemies certainly share a fundamental antipathy to a Jewish state in their midst, it is also clear that they do not necessarily share any affection for each other. In this connection, Project Daniel’s original recommendation that certain frontline Arab states and Iran could all be targeted following an anonymous existential attack may now need careful reconsideration and possibly revision. After all, in current circumstances, The Group’s original recommendation could be exploited by either set of Islamic enemies to crush the other via Israeli “reprisals.”

    Nuclear deterrence, ambiguous or partially disclosed, is essential to Israel's physical survival. If, for whatever reason, Israel should fail to prevent enemy state nuclearization, it will have to refashion its nuclear deterrent to conform to vastly more dangerous regional and world conditions. But even if this should require purposeful disclosure of its nuclear assets and doctrine (a disclosure involving, at least in part, relevant IIC elements), such revelation would have to be limited solely to what would be needed to convince Israel's enemies of both its capacity and its resolve. More particularly, this would mean revealing only those specific aspects needed to identify the survivability and penetration-capability of Israel's nuclear forces and the political will to launch these massive forces in retaliation for certain forms of enemy state aggression.

    The Group advised the Prime Minister that Israel must always do whatever it can to ensure a secure and recognizable second-strike nuclear capability. Once nuclear ambiguity was brought to an end, IIC-assisted nuclear disclosure could play a crucial communications role. The essence of deterrence here would lie in the communication of capacity and will to those who would do Israel existential harm. Significantly, the actual retaliatory use of nuclear weapons by Israel would signify the failure of its deterrent. Recalling the ancient Chinese military thinker Sun-Tzu, who was mentioned earlier, the very highest form of military success is achieved when one's strategic objectives can be met without any actual use of military force.

    To meet its "ultimate" deterrence objectives - that is, to deter the most overwhelmingly destructive enemy first strikes - Israel must still seek and achieve a visible second-strike capability to target approximately fifteen (15) enemy cities. Ranges would be to cities in Libya and Iran, and nuclear bomb yields would still be at a level "sufficient to fully compromise the aggressor's viability as a functioning state." By choosing counter-value-targeted warheads in this range of maximum-destructiveness, Israel could achieve optimal deterrent effect, thereby neutralizing the overall asymmetry between the Arab states/Iran and the State of Israel. All enemy targets, The Group reasoned, would be selected with the view that their destruction would promptly force the enemy aggressor to cease all nuclear/biological/chemical exchanges with Israel. Nothing has transpired to change this reasoning.

    As a professor of international law, I was able to assure The Group that all of our recommendations to the Prime Minister regarding Israeli nuclear deterrence were fully consistent with authoritative legal norms. On July 8, 1996, the International Court of Justice at The Hague (not known for any specifically pro-Israel sympathies by any means) handed down its Advisory Opinion on THE LEGALITY OF THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. The final paragraph concludes, inter alia:

    The threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law. However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.

    The Group advised the Prime Minister in 2003 that Israel must display flexibility in its nuclear deterrence posture in order to contend with future enemy expansions of nuclear weapon assets. It may even become necessary under certain circumstances, we recognized, that Israel should deploy a full "triad" of strategic nuclear forces. For the present, however, we recommended that Israel continue to manage without nuclear missile-bearing submarines. This recommendation still holds only as long as it remains highly improbable that any enemy or combination of enemies could destroy Israel's land-based and airborne-launched nuclear missiles on a first-strike attack. Presently, it seems absolutely clear that Israel’s strategic retaliatory forces remain fully secure and penetration-capable. It falls, at least in part, upon the IIC to ensure that such clarity endures.

    Israel's nuclear deterrent must be backed up by far-reaching active defenses. With this in mind, The Group emphasized that Israel take immediate steps to operationalize an efficient, multi-layered antiballistic missile system to intercept and destroy a finite number of enemy warheads. Such interception would have to take place with the very highest possible probability of success and with a fully reliable capacity to distinguish between incoming warheads and decoys. To the extent possible, Israel has already been markedly successful in meeting this requirement.

    Israel's "Arrow" missile defense system involves various arrangements with US Boeing Corporation. The Israel Air Force (IAF), which operates the Arrow, will likely continue to meet its desired goal of deploying interceptors in inventory on schedule. Arrow managers may also sell their product to certain other carefully selected states. This could help Israel to reinforce its qualitative edge over all adversaries. Israeli engineers are continually taking appropriate steps to ensure that Arrow will function well alongside American "Patriot" systems. The Group advised that IAF continue working energetically on all external and internal interoperability issues. This advice has surely been taken.

    In its effort to create a multi-layered defense system, Israel may already be working on an unmanned aircraft capable of hunting-down and killing any enemy's mobile ballistic missile launchers. Back in 2003, Israeli military officials had begun to interest the Pentagon in joining the launcher-attack project, known formally as "boost-phase launcher intercept" or BPLI. The Group advised the then Prime Minister that Israel undertake BPLI with or without US support, but recognized that gaining such support would allow the project to move forward more expeditiously and with greater cost-effectiveness. Also, enlisting US support for BPLI could represent another important step toward maintaining Israel's qualitative edge.

    Project Daniel underscored the importance of multi-layered active defenses for Israel, but affirmed most strongly that Israel must always prepare to act preemptively before there is any destabilizing deployment of enemy nuclear and/or certain biological weapons. No active defense system can ever be “leak proof,” yet protection of civilian populations in a very small country such as Israel calls for nothing less. (See, for example, Louis René Beres and MK/Major General (IAF/Res.) Isaac Ben-Israel, “The Limits of Deterrence,” The Washington Times, November 21, 2007).



    Looking back over the original recommendations of Project Daniel, The Group concerned itself with, inter alia, the need for an expanded policy of preemption; an ongoing re-evaluation of "nuclear ambiguity;” recognizable preparations for appropriate "counter-value" reprisals in the case of certain WMD aggressions; adaptations to a "paradigm shift" away from classical patterns of warfare; expanded cooperation with the United States in the War Against Terror and in future inter-state conflicts in the Middle East; deployment of suitable active defense systems; avoidance of nuclear war-fighting wherever possible; and various ways to improve Israel's nuclear deterrence. Along the way we had also explored vital differences between rational and non-rational adversaries; changing definitions of existential harms; legal elements of "anticipatory self-defense;" possibilities for peaceful dispute settlements in the region; budgetary constraints and opportunities; maintaining Israel's qualitative edge; preparations for "regime targeting;" and implications for Israel of the growing anarchy in world affairs.

    Originally, we wrote that ISRAEL'S STRATEGIC FUTURE must be understood as a work in progress. In this regard, absolutely nothing has changed. The geo-strategic context within which Israel must still fashion its future is continually evolving, and so, accordingly, must Israel's strategic doctrine. Ultimately it must be from precisely such doctrine that the Jewish State's particular policies will have to be abstracted, derived, adjusted and implemented.

    Since the presentation of our original document to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon on January 16, 2003, there have been a few minor "victories" in the effort to control WMD proliferation among Israel's enemies. A case in point may be Libya. At the same time, the circumstances in North Korea (which has manifest ties to some of Israel's regional enemies), Iran and Pakistan8 remain highly volatile and dangerous. There is also still evidence of expanding WMD ambitions in Egypt and Syria. At the level of terrorist groups, which are sustained by several Arab/Islamic states, new alignments are being fashioned between various Palestinian factions and al-Qaeda. The precise configurations of these alignments are complex and multifaceted, but the net effect for Israel – and therefore also for the United States - is unmistakably negative. (See, for example, Louis René Beres and Herb London, “Al Qaeda’s Mideast Linkage,” The Washington Times, October 17, 2004; and Louis René Beres and Clare Lopez, “Palestinian al-Qaeda Plans,” The Washington Times, December 6, 2006).

    ISRAEL'S STRATEGIC FUTURE was founded on the presumption that current threats of war, terrorism and genocide derive from a very clear "clash of civilizations," and not merely from narrow geo-strategic differences. Today, more than six years after completion of our report, both Israel and the United States remain in the cross hairs of a worldwide Arab/Islamist "Jihad" that is basically cultural/theological in nature, and that will not concede an inch to conventional norms of "coexistence" or "peaceful settlement." This situation of ongoing danger to "unbelievers" is hardly a pleasing one for Jerusalem and Washington, but it is one that must now be acknowledged forthrightly and dealt with intelligently. This means that it must be embedded in any serious theories of strategic survival. (See, for example, Louis René Beres and Clare Lopez, “The True Meanings of Suicide-Bombing Terrorism: What Our Next President Must Know,” The Washington Times, November 6, 2008).

    In constructing workable strategies, Israel’s thinkers and planners must keep in mind that nothing will be more practical than good theory. In all complex strategy matters, theory is a net. Only those who cast will catch.

    The still-ongoing war in Iraq has demonstrated the evident and substantial weaknesses of US strategic theory, and also of US national intelligence agencies. Israel, too, is not without a history of serious intelligence failures (to wit, Israeli problems in the 2006 Lebanon war). Israel's strategic future will require a substantially enhanced intelligence infrastructure together with certain highly refined "backup systems." Facing still-growing isolation in the “international community,” it will also have to fend for itself more than ever before. (See, for example, Louis René Beres, After The Falling Rockets From Lebanon: Interrelated Commentaries on Israel’s Performance and Survival, Ariel Center for Policy Research (ACPR), ACPR Policy paper No. 166, Israel, January 2007, 80 pp.).

    Israel's strategic future is still fraught with existential risk and danger.9 It is essential, therefore, that Israel still approach this uncertain future with utter realism and candor. A nuclear war against the Jewish State would likely be undertaken as a distinct form of genocide,10 and there can still be no greater obligation for Israel than to ensure protection from any such new crimes against humanity.

    In the end, this task will require an antecedent and distinctly capable commitment to good intelligence. Whatever modes of protection are selected (deterrence, defense, preemption, etc.), and whatever their precise configurations of operability, without hard and reliable intelligence about adversarial intentions and capabilities, Israel would be functioning with one hand tied behind its back. In this connection, it should also go without saying that determined clandestine operations and disinformation disseminations of all kinds being undertaken against Israel must be rapidly and suitably countered, lest Israel’s essential strategic plans should become vulnerable to compromise. In these times, and with particular reference to Iran, such indispensable Israeli counterintelligence functions must always be carried out in a timely fashion.


    Professor Louis René Beres, Chair, USA

    Naaman Belkind, Former Assistant to the Deputy Minister of Defense for Special Means, Israel

    MK, Maj. Gen. (Res.), Israeli Air Force, Professor Isaac Ben-Israel, Israel

    Dr. Rand H. Fishbein, Former Professional Staff Member, US Senate Appropriations Committee and Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to US Senator Daniel K. Inouye, USA

    Dr. Adir Pridor, Lt. COL. (Ret.), Israeli Air Force; Former Head of Military Analyses, RAFAEL, Israel

    Former MK/COL (Res.), Israeli Air Force,  Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, Israel



    Louis René Beres, Chair of Project Daniel, was educated at Princeton (Ph.D., 1971) and publishes widely on Israeli security matters. Professor of International Law at Purdue University, he is the author of many Policy Papers of the Ariel Center for Policy Research and also of several hundred magazine and journal articles. Professor Beres is the author of nine major books in the field, and is Strategic and Military Affairs Columnist for The Jewish Press. His recent scholarly writings have appeared in International Security (Harvard), in several dozen law review articles, and in such selected US Department of Defense publications as Parameters: The Journal of the US Army War College and Special Warfare.

    Naaman Belkind is a retired engineer with 33 years of service in the Israel Atomic Energy Commission and the Israeli Ministry of Defense. A former Assistant to the Deputy Minister of Defense for Special Means, he headed various projects at the Nuclear Research Center in Dimona and served as Science Counselor at Israel’s Embassy in Washington, DC.

    MK Isaac Ben-Israel holds a Ph.D. from Tel Aviv University, where he studied mathematics, physics and philosophy.  The author of numerous articles and several books on military issues, he has held several senior posts in operations, intelligence and weapons development within the Israel Air Force. In January 1998 he was promoted to Major General and appointed as Director of Defense R&D Directorate in IMOD. Maj-Gen. Ben-Israel, a Member of Knesset and former head of the Israel Space Agency, has been teaching at Tel Aviv University since 1989.

    Rand H. Fishbein, Ph.D., received his doctorate, with distinction, in International Relations/Middle East Studies from The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies SAIS). He was a recipient of two Fulbright Fellowships for Middle East Study at St. Antony's College, Oxford University and the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. Currently, Dr. Fishbein is President of Fishbein Associates Inc., a public-policy consulting firm based in Potomac, Maryland. Dr. Fishbein is a former Professional Staff Member of the US Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee and the US Senate Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee, as well as the former Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to Senator Daniel K. Inouye (D-HI).  During his years of service on the staff of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Dr. Fishbein conceived of and authored numerous programs and initiatives in support of US national security interests in the Middle East.  He was the author of the first sanctions bill targeting the regime of Saddam Hussein ten months before the Iraqi leader invaded Kuwait.

    Adir Pridor, Lt. Col. (IAF/Ret.) holds a Ph.D. in Mathematics from The Hebrew University in Jerusalem and is currently Head of the Institute for Industrial Mathematics, which he established in 1992. A co-founder of the Operations Research Branch of the Israel Air Force, Dr. Pridor’s wide-ranging analytical studies have focused upon such issues as airfield vulnerability; air defense effectiveness; aircraft survivability in special missions; damage analysis; defense organization; missile threat assessment; threat forecast and force building, operational planning and others.

    Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, Col./Res., Israeli Air Force, was a Member of the 12th Knesset and of the 1991 Madrid Peace Mission. A member of the Israel Society of Aeronautics and Astronautics and of the Society of Experimental Test Pilots, COL. Tsiddon-Chatto served as Chief of Planning and Operational Requirements for the IAF prior to the Six Day War. A member of RAFAEL (Armament Development Board) from 1992 until 1995, he publishes extensively on security issues in Israel and elsewhere. A founding member of the Ariel Center for Policy Research, Tsiddon-Chatto is the author of several major ACPR Policy Papers.



    1 See Israel’s Strategic Future: Project Daniel, Ariel Center for Policy Research (ACPR), ACPR Policy Paper No. 155, Israel, May 2004, 64 pp. This document was originally prepared only for confidential presentation to the Prime Minister, and not intended for publication.


     This document will not make reference to any of the particular components of the IIC (e.g., Military Intelligence vs. Mossad), but will simply identify this community in its entirety.

    3 See, on terrorism, L.R. Beres, “The Legal Meaning of Terrorism for the Military Commander,” CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Spring 1996; and L.R, Beres, “The Meaning of Terrorism: Jurisprudential and Definitional Clarifications,” VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW, February 1995.

    4 We also remain fully aware that any future preemptive action against Iranian nuclear assets and infrastructures would be vastly more operationally difficult than Osiraq. See, for example, Louis René Beres and Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, “Reconsidering Israel’s Destruction of Iraq’s Osiraq Nuclear Reactor,” Menachem Begin Heritage Center, Israel’s Strike Against the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor, June 7, 1981, Jerusalem, Israel, September 2003, pp. 59-60.

    5 See, for example, L.R. Beres, “In Support of Anticipatory Self-Defense: Israel, Osiraq and International Law,” CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY, Vol. 19, No. 2., August 1998, pp. 111-114; L.R. Beres, “Israel and Anticipatory Self-Defense,” ARIZONA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, Vol. 8., 1991, pp. 89-99; L.R. Beres, “Israel, Force and International Law: Assessing Anticipatory Self-Defense,” THE JERUSALEM JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Vol. 13, No. 2., June 1991; and L.R. Beres, “After the Gulf War: Israel, Preemption and Anticipatory Self-Defense,” HOUSTON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, May 1991.

    6 See, for example, L.R. Beres, “Religious Extremism and International Legal Norms: Perfidy, Preemption and Irrationality,” CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 39, No. 3., pp. 709-730.

    7 See, on this point, L.R. Beres, “On Assassination, Preemption and Counter-Terrorism: The View From International Law,” Keynote Address, delivered by Professor Beres at the Intelligence Summit, St. Petersburg, March 5, 2007; published in INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, Vol. 21, No. 4., Winter 2008-2009, pp. 694-725; L.R. Beres. “The Newly Expanded American Doctrine of Preemption: Can It Include Assassination,” DENVER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY, Vol. 31, No. 2., Winter 2002; L.R. Beres, “On Assassination as Anticipatory Self-Defense: The Case of Israel,” HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW, Winter 1991, 13 pp; and L.R. Beres, “International Law and the Killing of Imad Mughniyeh,” THE ISRAEL JOURNAL OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Vol. 2, No. 2., 2008, pp. 79-84.

    8 On related problems involving Pakistan and India, see, L.R. Beres, “In A Dark Time: The Expected Consequences of an India-Pakistan Nuclear War,” AMERICAN UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW, Vol. 14, No. 2., pp. 497-518.

    9 This danger includes creation of a Palestinian state. See, L.R. Beres, “Implications of a Palestinian State for Israeli Security and Nuclear War: A Jurisprudential Assessment,” DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 17, No. 2, Winter 1999, pp. 229-286.

    10 See, for example, L.R. Beres, “Genocide, Death and Anxiety: A Jurisprudential/Psychiatric Analysis,” TEMPLE INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1996, pp. 281-312; L.R. Beres, “International Law, Personhood and the Prevention of Genocide,” LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 11, No. 1., 1989; and L.R. Beres, “Genocide and Genocide-Like Crimes,” in M. Cherif Bassiouni, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, Vol. 1., Crimes, 1986, pp. 271-279.



    Column One: Israel's rare opportunity

    Jun. 19, 2009
    Caroline Glick , THE JERUSALEM POST
    Israel today finds itself in unfamiliar territory. The revolutionary atmosphere building in Iran presents Israel with a prospect it has rarely confronted: a safe bet. With the Obama administration refusing to back the anti-regime protesters, and the European Union similarly hemming and hawing, millions of Iranians who are on the streets, risking their lives to protest a stolen election and a tyrannical regime, have been cast adrift by those they thought would support them. To date, Israel has joined the US and Europe in rejecting the protesters. This should change.
    In refusing to stick their necks out - and so effectively siding with the mullahs against the pro-democracy activists in the streets - US President Barack Obama, like Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Mossad chief Meir Dagan, have all rightly pointed out that Mir Hossein Mousavi, Iran's former prime minister and the titular head of the protest movement, is just as radical and extreme as Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad whom he seeks to unseat.
    Moreover, Western officials and analysts point out that Mousavi's primary backers from within the regime - former presidents Muhammad Khatami and Rafsanjani - are themselves anything but anti-regime revolutionaries.
    What apparently motivates these men is the sense that through Ahmadinejad's heavy-handed attacks against the revolution's "old guard," the presidential incumbent has shunted them aside. They feel slighted. And they are doubly humiliated by the fact that Ahmadinejad has acted with the open support of Iran's real dictator - so-called "Supreme Leader" Ali Khamenei. The likes of Mousavi, Khatami and Rafsanjani don't want to overthrow the regime whose aims they share. They just want to restore their power within the regime.
    It is these twin assessments of Mousavi and his backers that stand at the center of Western leaders' decision to give a wide berth both to the presidential race and to the protests that have arisen in its aftermath.
    For Israel, the arguments for staying clear of events in Iran align with those informing much of the rest of the Western world. Israel's primary concern is Iran's foreign policy and specifically its nuclear weapons program and its support for anti-Israel terror groups. There is no reason for Israel to believe that a Mousavi government will be more inclined to end Iran's race to the bomb or diminish its support for terror groups like Hizbullah and Hamas than Ahmadinejad's government is. As prime minister in the 1980s, Mousavi was a major instigator of Iran's nuclear program and he oversaw the establishment of Hizbullah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
    Beyond that, there is the fact that Israel - like the US - is the regime's bogeyman. If Israel is identified with the protesters, the likes of Khamenei will use this connection to justify their brutal repression.
    Finally, there is the distinct possibility, indeed the likelihood, that these protests will go nowhere. They will be brutally repressed or fizzle out of their own accord. So would Israel gain by sticking its neck out?
    While reasonable on their face, these arguments for doing nothing all ignore the significance of recent developments. Consequently they fail to grasp the new opportunities that have arisen - opportunities which left untouched will likely disappear in short order.
    The fact of the matter is that with each passing day, Mousavi's personal views and interests are becoming increasingly irrelevant. Whether he realized it or not, Mousavi was transformed last Friday night. When Khamenei embraced the obviously falsified official election results as a "divine victory" for Ahmadinejad, Mousavi was widely expected by Western observers to accept the dictator's verdict. When instead he sided with his own supporters who took to the streets to oppose their disenfranchisement, Mousavi became a revolutionary. Whether he had planned to do so or not, a week ago Mousavi became an enemy of the regime.
    The significance of Mousavi's decision could not be more profound. As Michael Ledeen from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies wrote Wednesday at the Pajamas Media Web site, last Friday night Mousavi tied his personal survival to the success of the protesters - and pitted his life against Khamenei's. In Ledeen's words, "Both Khamenei and Mousavi - the two opposed icons of the moment, at least - know that they will either win or die."
    For their part, by the end of this week, the protesters themselves had been transformed. If last week they were simply angry that they had been ignored, by Thursday they had become a revolutionary force apparently dedicated to the overthrow of the regime. This was made clear by a list of demands circulating among the protesters on Wednesday. As Pepe Escobar reported in Thursday's Asia Times, the protesters demands include Khamenei's removal from power, the dissolution of the secret police, the reform of the constitution under anti-regime Ayatollah Hossein Montazeri, who has been living under house arrest for the past 12 years, and the installation of Mousavi as president. These demands make clear where the protesters are leading. They are leading to the overthrow of one of the most heinous regimes on the face of the earth and its replacement by a liberal democracy.
    As far as Israel is concerned, this is a win-win situation. If the protesters successfully overthrow the regime, they will have neutralized the greatest security threat facing the Jewish state. And if they fail, Israel will still probably be better off than it is today. For if the mullahs violently repress the pro-democracy dissidents, the Obama administration will be hard-pressed to legitimize their blood bath by embracing them as negotiating partners.
    Were Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to publicly announce Israel's support for the protesters, Israel would stand to gain politically in a number of ways. First and foremost, it would be doing the right thing morally and so would earn the respect of millions of people throughout the world who are dismayed at their own governments' silence in the face of the brave Iranian protesters risking their lives for freedom.
    Moreover, by acting as the loudest and first democratic champion of the protesters, Israel would catapult itself to the forefront of the campaign for democracy in the Muslim world. Doing so would make it far easier for Israel's representatives throughout the world to defend against false accusations by self-described human rights organizations that Israel is a human rights abuser.
    Beyond that, Israel would be building an important alliance with the Iranian people themselves. Contrary to what the mullahs would have us believe, Iranians by and large do not share the widespread hatred of Israel and the Jews that their regime promotes and the Arab world embraces. Over the years, Iranian regime opponents - from the students to the trade unionists to women's rights activists to minority Kurds, Azeris, Ahwaz Arabs and Baluchis - have all appealed to Israel for support. Israel Radio in Farsi, which broadcasts into Iran daily, has more than a million regular listeners.
    Were Netanyahu to explain that the same mullahs who seek to disenfranchise and repress the Iranian people seek to destroy Israel with nuclear bombs; were he to call for Iran to stop financing Hamas and Hizbullah terrorists who are reportedly now deployed in Iran to brutalize the protesters, and instead invest in the Iranian economy for the benefit of Iran's people, he would be sending a message that already resonates with the people of Iran.
    Finally, Israeli outreach to the Iranian people now struggling to overthrow the regime would expose the Obama administration's effective support for the mullahs against their people in all its absurdity and moral blindness. What's more, the administration would be unable to launch a counterattack. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Obama would be in no position to attack Israel for supporting Iranian dissidents demanding freedom. And their stammering reaction would make their attacks against Jewish building in Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria look ever more ridiculous.
    Although Israel is far away from Iran, it has significant capacity to help the demonstrators. It could use its communication satellites to break through the communications blackout the regime has attempted to enforce. Its Internet capabilities can be offered to the protesters to reopen closed networks. Israel could temporarily expand its radio broadcasts into the country and allow its airwaves to be used to broadcast events on the ground in real time so that protesters won't have to rely on word of mouth to know what is happening or where things are leading.
    Again, it is more than possible that Khamenei will move to crush the dissidents or successfully buy enough of them off to subvert them. But in the meantime, Israel has a clear interest in keeping the Iranian cauldron boiling. The mullahs can only concentrate on so much at once. If they are preoccupied with domestic dissent, they will have less time to devote to Hamas and Hizbullah. If they are busy quelling armed insurrections by Kurds or Azeris or Baluchis, they will have less time to devote to negotiating the purchase of the S-300 anti-aircraft system with Russia, or keeping tabs on their nuclear scientists. Strategically, Israel stands only to gain - either marginally or massively - from the ayatollahs' discomfort.
    In an interview this week with National Review Online, Iranian expatriate Amir Taheri explained that Iran suffers from a divided psyche. On the one hand, the mullahs view Iran as a revolutionary vanguard of Islam. They do not see Iran as a nation-state. For them, the normal things that make up a life - economic stability, public safety and the hope that one's children will do better - are of little use as they march forward under the flag of jihad. Israel and the US are necessary enemies.
    On the other hand, the vast majority of Iran's people wish to live in a normal and free nation-state. For them, the revolution means nothing but privation, suffering, repression and death. They do not hate America and they do not hate Israel. They do not seek nuclear weapons and they do not support the likes of Hamas and Hizbullah.
    As Taheri put it, "When we consider Iran as a nation-state, we see Israel as its natural ally. The reason is that Israel, like Iran, is opposed to an exclusively Arab Middle East. Both want a pluralist Middle East in which there is room for diversity; a Middle East where one finds Iranians, Turks, Kurds, Christians and Jews, as well as Arabs."
    If Israel extends a hand in friendship to these Iranian patriots, the worst that can happen is that they fail to overthrow the mullahs and we are left to acknowledge that we wished them well. There is no shame in that.
    Indeed, if they fail to overthrow the regime, and Israel is compelled to attack their country's nuclear installations, it is hard to imagine that they will take it personally. Rather, recalling that it was Israel that stood with them first, they would no doubt understand why we were forced to act, and perhaps be inspired to try again to free themselves from the shackles of their hideous regime.



    Column One: Barack Obama vs international law

    Jun. 25, 2009
    Caroline Glick , THE JERUSALEM POST
    US President Barack Obama consistently couches his demand that Israel prohibit Jewish people from constructing or expanding our homes and communities in Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria in legal-sounding language.
    Obama has called settlements "illegitimate." And he has said that Israel "has obligations under the road map," while referring disparagingly to "settlements that, in past agreements, have been categorized as illegal."
    Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Obama's Middle East envoy George Mitchell have repeatedly uttered similar statements.
    By characterizing its demand that Israel prohibit Jews from building homes in Israel's capital city and its heartland as a legal requirement, the Obama administration portrays Israel as an international outlaw. After all, if building homes for Jews is a crime, and Israel is not prohibiting Jews from building homes, then Israel is at best guilty of enabling a crime to take place, and at worst, it is a criminal state.
    It makes good political sense for the Obama administration to make its case against Israel in this fashion. According to a survey of US public opinion published in early 2006 by the Boston Review, whereas only 7 percent of Democrats support going to war to spread democracy - versus 53% of Republicans; 71% of Democrats - versus 36% of Republicans - support going to war to help the United Nations "uphold international law." What this poll shows is that for Obama supporters, the idea that Israel should be treated poorly because it is in breach of international law resonates deeply.
    The problem with the Obama administration's characterization of a ban on Jewish building in Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria as an Israeli legal obligation is that Israel has never taken upon itself a legal obligation to prohibit such building activities. Israel has never signed an agreement that has characterized any Jewish communities as "illegal."
    Moreover, both former prime minister Ariel Sharon's chief of staff Dov Weisglass and former president George W. Bush's deputy national security adviser for the Middle East Elliott Abrams have gone on record stating that Sharon's much vaunted decision to curtail Jewish building in Judea and Samaria (never Jerusalem), in line with the road map negotiating framework, was based on a series of explicit understandings with the Bush administration that spelled out the scope of Jewish building that Israel would maintain for the duration of the peace process. As Abrams wrote on Thursday in The Wall Street Journal, "Not only were there agreements, but the prime minister of Israel relied on them..."
    Then, too, since the road map was approved as a mere cabinet decision - as opposed to an international agreement - the Netanyahu government has no legal obligation to actively advance it. Indeed, if it wishes, it can abrogate Israel's acceptance of the document at any time simply by calling for another vote.
    More importantly perhaps from the Obama administration's perspective is that the road map itself lacks the force of international law. Although it was adopted by the Security Council, it was not adopted as an internationally binding document under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Consequently, Israel has no international legal obligation to end Jewish construction in Judea and Samaria or Jerusalem.
    Like the US, Israel is a signatory to the 1976 International Convention for Civil and Political Rights, which among other things prohibits all forms of discrimination against people on the basis of religion and nationality.
    Consequently, Israel is barred from discriminating specifically against Jews who wish to build homes on legally controlled lands in Judea and Samaria. As a binding treaty, this convention takes precedence over the nonbinding road map. Indeed, given the road map's prejudicial position on Jewish building it can be reasonably argued that the road map itself calls for a breach of international law.
    Finally, there is always the claim made by Israel's critics that Jewish communities located beyond the 1949 armistice lines are illegal by dint of the Fourth Geneva Convention from 1949. That convention prohibits an occupying power from transferring parts of its population to occupied territory. Legal authorities have long disputed whether this convention is applicable to Judea and Samaria, but even if it is applicable, according to Prof. Avi Bell from Bar-Ilan University Law School, it "only proscribes state actions."
    Bell explains, "The Fourth Geneva Convention does not purport to limit in any way what individual Jews may or may not do on their legally held property or where they may or may not choose to live."
    WHEREAS UPON examination it is clear that the Obama administration is wrong in insinuating that Israel is in breach of its international legal commitments through its refusal to bar Jewish construction in Judea, Samaria and Jerusalem, the Obama administration's own policy toward the Palestinians places it in clear breach of both binding international law and domestic US law.
    On September 28, 2001, the UN Security Council passed binding Resolution 1373. Resolution 1373, which was initiated by the US government, and was passed by authority of Chapter VII, committed all UN member states to "refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts." Resolution 1373 further required UN member states to "deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts or provide safe haven" to those that do.
    In 1995, the US State Department acknowledged that Hamas fits the legal definition of a terrorist organization. Today, due to its policies toward Hamas, the Obama administration is in breach of both Resolution 1373 - that is, of international law - and of US domestic law barring the provision of support and financing to foreign terrorist organizations.
    According to an internal State Department document cited Wednesday by
    the Atlas Shrugs Web site, the US has already transferred or is in the process of allocating $300 million dollars to Gaza through USAID and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Since Hamas controls "humanitarian" organizations in Gaza, and Hamas has openly and repeatedly stolen "humanitarian aid," there is little doubt the transfer of funds to Gaza constitutes indirect assistance to Hamas and is therefore prohibited by Resolution 1373 as well as by US statute.
    The Obama administration is further in breach of international and domestic US law due to its attempts to coerce Israel into opening international passages between Israel and Gaza to enable trade and commerce with Hamas-controlled Gaza and to end or curtail travel restrictions for people between Gaza and Israel. Resolution 1373 stipulates that all states must "prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls." Given the fact that the Gaza side of the border is controlled by a terrorist organization, any significant relaxation of Israeli border controls puts Israel at risk of facilitating the movement of terrorists and permitting direct and indirect support to terrorists.
    So too, Resolution 1373 requires all states to "ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetuation of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice." Yet rather than calling on Israel to arrest all persons working with Hamas and operating in its territory, the US itself pledged $900m. to rebuilding Gaza. Moreover, it is demanding that Israel allow the importation of dual use materials such as cement into Gaza which will enable Hamas to rebuild its infrastructures that were destroyed during Operation Cast Lead. It is also attempting to coerce Israel into transferring cash to Hamas-controlled banks in Gaza.
    Then, too, as Dan Diker reported in a study published by the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, US-supported Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salaam Fayad recently acknowledged that the US-financed PA continues to pay the salaries of Hamas terrorists.
    Multiple news reports in recent days have indicated that the Obama administration is working to facilitate the establishment of a Palestinian government that will include Hamas. US efforts to legitimize the incorporation of a terrorist group in a Palestinian government are a severe violation of US and international law. This is the case since it would clearly involve aiding a designated terrorist organization and helping to provide it with a safe haven.
    Hamas is not the only terrorist organization to which the Obama administration is providing assistance - again, in apparent breach of international and US law. The administration is also aiding Hizbullah. Ahead of his June 4 address in Cairo, Obama met with members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood at the White House. He also invited members of the Muslim Brotherhood to be present at his speech at Cairo University.
    Shortly before the White House meeting, Egyptian legal authorities alleged that the Muslim Brotherhood provided material support to Hizbullah terrorists in Egypt. These Hizbullah operatives - and their Muslim Brotherhood partners - were allegedly engaged in a plot to commit massive terrorist attacks in Egypt whose goal was the illegal overthrow of the government. That is, the Muslim Brotherhood was allegedly involved in a terrorist conspiracy led by Hizbullah - a designated foreign terrorist organization. Furthermore, the plot was apparently hatched by Iran - which the US State Department has designated as state sponsor of terrorism.
    By meeting with representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood suspected of providing material support to a designated terrorist organization, Obama was arguably illegally providing indirect assistance to Hizbullah - again in breach of Resolution 1373 and US law.
    Then there is the US's direct assistance to the Lebanese military. During the 2006 war between Israel and Hizbullah, the Lebanese military provided direct assistance to Hizbullah operatives in carrying out their illegal war against Israel. Since then, expanding Hizbullah influence over the Lebanese military has been copiously documented. Consequently, by providing direct US military assistance - including weapons - to the Lebanese military, the US government is arguably in breach of Resolution 1373 and US law.
    GOING BACK for a moment to the Palestinians, Hamas of course is not the only terrorist organization that is materially assisted by the Obama administration's policies. As Itamar Marcus and Barbara Crook wrote in The Jerusalem Post last month, the US is financing the construction of a Palestinian computer center named for arch Fatah terrorist Dalal Mughrabi, who led the 1978 bus bombing on Israel's coastal highway in which 37 civilians, including 12 children and US citizen Gail Rubin, were murdered.
    As Marcus and Crook note, the 2008 US Foreign Operations Bill bars US assistance to the Palestinians from being used "for the purpose of recognizing or otherwise honoring individuals who commit or have committed acts of terrorism."
    Obama, the former law professor, never tires of invoking international law. And yet, when one considers his policies toward Israel on the one hand, and his policies toward illegal terrorist organizations on the other, it is clear that Obama's respect for international law is mere rhetoric. True champions of law in both Israel and the US should demand an end to his administration's contempt for the US's actual - rather than imaginary - legal obligations.