by Morris J. Amitay 

Column for January 3, 2006

There have been some recent glaring examples which prove that some Jews may not really be that smart when it comes to acknowledging their own self interest.

Writing in Ha'aretz, (the Israeli equivalent of the New York Times when it comes to undermining national security), an Israeli academic suggested that the solution to Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons is for Israel "to initiate nuclear disarmament". By undertaking this "diplomatic initiative", according to the learned professor, "Israel could bring real international pressure to bear" on Iran. This reminds one of the black sheriff in Mel Brooks' classic "Blazing Saddles" holding a gun to his own head and threatening to shoot himself if the hostile racist crowd did not disperse. Only in the movies, would a threat of suicide convince the sheriff's enemies to let him escape. In the real world, Iranian threats to annihilate Israel must be taken seriously.

Whether is was Saddam Hussein in 1991 admitting that he did not put chemical warheads on the SCUDs that hit Tel-Aviv fearing Israeli nuclear retaliation, or Egyptian plans not to advance too deeply into the Sinai in 1973, for the same reason, Israel's Arab foes have taken Israel's nuclear arsenal into their calculations. But in December 2001 former Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani publicly proclaimed that a single Iranian nuke could completely devastate Israel, but Iran, with its 70 million people, could sustain an Israeli nuclear retaliatory strike. More recently we have heard Iran's current President calling for Israel to be wiped off the map. These unequivocal statements of intent were made while Iran is going full speed ahead with its covert efforts to develop nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. While there is considerable ferment in Iranian society which! could eventually lead to regime change - it is a safe bet Iran's mullahs will have their nukes long before this happens. Given these circumstances, for Israel to set a good example by relinquishing its nuclear deterrent gives new meaning to stupidity. What we could hope for over time, in the best of circumstances, is that norms of civil society, genuine democracy, religious reforms and modernity slowly seep into most of the Arab and Muslim world, therby lessing the threat to Israel and the region. But until then, it is better for stability in the region that Israel's foes acknowledge the terrible destructive power of provoking an Israel nuclear response.

Other voices, ! equally disingenuous, have counseled that Israel can learn to live with a nuclear-armed Iran, with the same kind of balance of terror that prevailed during the Cold War between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Wrong! The calculations of religious fanatics are simply not the same as those were of cold-blooded commissars. Israel, by necessity, is reportedly developing a "second strike" capability utilizing its small number of Dolphin submarines armed with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. However, given Israel's small size and concentrated population, upon completion of its retaliatory mission, these undersea craft would have very little to return to following any successful nuclear detonation in Israel. Also, there is the possibility of the acquisition of a nuclear device by an amorphous terrorist group which might claim responsibility for the attack on Israel, thereby raising the dilemma of whether Israel obliterates a dozen Iranian cities in response.

It is precisely because of these uncertainties that any abandonment at this time - and for the foreseeable future given attitudes in too much of the Muslim world - of Israel's nuclear deterrent would be unmitigated

Closer to home, there is also reason to question the wisdom of some of our co-religionists. The American Jewish Committee's recent poll results showed that 70% of Jewish Americans disapporving of the war in Iraq, with some 60% unhappy with the way the Government is handling the campaign against terrorism - the assumption being that this 60% doesn't think we should be tougher! At the same time, however, 79% in the poll stated that "caring about Israel" was a very important part of their Jewish identity. Something must be missing here. Isn't it the goal of the Islamofacist terrorists to end Israel's (and America's) existence? Didn't the removal of Saddam Hussein from power eliminate a very real threat to Israel and create the opportunity for greater democracy to spread in the Middle East? Wouldn't all this be considered "good for the Jews"?

This glaring inconsistency might be attributed by the fact that the largest percentage of those polled identified themseles as either Reform Jews or "just Jewish". This would fit in with the Reform movement's recent public call for "a clear exit strategy with specific goals for troop withdrawl" from Iraq. The Union for Reform Judaism's titular head, Rabbi Eric Yoffie, seems obsessed with having to frequently burnish his liberal credentials at Israel's expense. The Union's positions on a variety of issues it deems to be "Jewish" concerns only reinforce the impression that Yoffie's particular brand of Judaism could aptly be described as "the ultra-liberal wing of the Democratic Party - with holidays". And following suit, the head of the Union's Washington office has expressed his "great concern" over what he questionably ca! lled "domestic spying".

The damage created by these misguided policy statements, ostensibly on behalf of all those belonging to Reform Congregations, goes beyond disproving the notion that Jews are smart enough to know what is good for them. At a time when Islamic terrorism remains a threat to our nation, and American troops are fighting and dying in Iraq, this slavish adherence to a brand of secular humanism and to the sentiments expressed by the Howard Dean/Cindy Sheehan wing of the Democratic Party sends a terrible message to Israel's staunchest friends in Washington. It is also a source of shame for those Jewish Americans who want our nation to prevail in the struggle to bring freedom to Iraq, and who support effective actions to prote! ct us from future terrorist attacks. What this means is that we must do a better job of teaching more Jewish Americans to be both more thoughtful Americans and more thoughtful Jews. The two are not incompatible.

ISRAEL AFTER SHARON

by Caroline Glick

THE JERUSALEM POST- Jan. 5, 2006

Wednesday night ushered in a new era in Israel's political history. As we watch and worry as Prime Minister Ariel Sharon dangles between life and death, one thing is absolutely clear. Sharon's massive cerebral hemorrhage on Wednesday night spelled the end of his political career. Sharon will never return to lead the State of Israel. He will never make a full recovery.

Whatever one's views of Sharon's policies and the quality of his leadership, no Israeli can feel anything but sorrow at Sharon's abrupt demise. A nation's sudden and dramatic separation from its leader is never a good thing. It is all the more debilitating when the leader in question is as popular and powerful as Sharon.

There will come a proper time to inquire into the reports we received about Sharon's health in the three weeks that passed since the premier suffered his initial stroke. Those questions will no doubt focus on statements by his spin doctors attesting to his good health and on the media's refusal to ask hard questions about Sharon's ability to continue in office after that first stroke. But now, as we enter the post-Sharon era, those questions are beside the point. The task that now besets our political leadership and the Israeli people as a whole is to focus on the country's present challenges -- for they suffer no delay.

Without a doubt, the greatest challenge facing the State of Israel today is Iran's nuclear weapons program.

Until Wednesday night, the rumor-mill running between Jerusalem, Washington and the capital cities of Europe was full of reports that Sharon planned to order an Israeli attack against Iran's nuclear installations just before our general elections at the end of March. There was nothing new in these rumors. Similar ones have been making the rounds for over a year now. In autumn 2004 for instance, it was whispered that Sharon would order such an attack on the day of the US presidential elections in November 2004. This past spring it was claimed that Sharon would give the order during the IDF's withdrawal from Gaza and northern Samaria. And now, for the past two months or so, rumors have circulated that Sharon was planning a strike to destroy Iran's nuclear installations just ahead of the elections on March 28.

There can be no room for doubt. The need to conduct a military strike against Iran's nuclear program increases with each passing day. The threat that Iran's nuclear weapons program constitutes for Israel is the most egregious example since the Holocaust of what happens when states and societies where anti-Semitism is of a genocidal nature are allowed to acquire the means to attack the Jews.

Israel's experience, like the experience of the Jewish people throughout its history, has taught that such anti-Semites seek out opportunities to use their acquired means to kill Jews. And now, against the increasingly tangible threat that Iran will soon acquire nuclear capabilities, Israel finds itself in an election season marked by political uncertainty and instability.

Even in the absence of domestic political chaos, any Israeli plan to attack Iran's nuclear facilities is today hampered by two things. First, the anti-Semitism that is endemic in the Iranian regime is equally endemic throughout the entire Muslim and Arab world. Were Iran to carry out tomorrow President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's promise to complete Hitler's work, such an act would no doubt be met with glee throughout the Arab and Muslim world.

As well, Iran has been able to advance its nuclear weapons program in large part due to the vast increase in anti-Semitic sentiments throughout the Western world. Over the past five years, the notion that there is something acceptable about murdering Jews and seeking to destroy Israel has met with increasing acceptance among large swathes of European society and the ranks of the international Left. Today, as Israel enters the post-Sharon era, it is hindered by unprecedented diplomatic weakness, largely as a result of the prevalence of Western anti-Semitism and its concomitant demand that Israel do all it can to appease its enemies.

For Israel to be capable of carrying out an attack against Iran's nuclear installations it will need to receive US and NATO backing for the move. The majority of international security analysts agree that Israeli fighter bombers en route to Iran will need to fly over Iraqi airspace and may even need to refuel in Iraq. Turkish bases may also be necessary. Given this, Israel is today in dire need of leadership capable of handling some of the most sensitive and monumental diplomacy in its history - even if such leadership were only able to convince others to carry out the attacks in our place.

The genocidal anti-Semitism that lies at the root of Iran's quest to destroy Israel with nuclear weapons is also the source of Palestinian-led terror war against Israel. Yet, unlike the case of Iran, whose wherewithal to match its desire to destroy Israel with actual military capabilities has been uninfluenced by Israeli actions, the Palestinians' terror capabilities have been vastly expanded as a direct result of Israeli policies.

Today, as the Palestinian Authority has ceased to operate in any coherent manner; as the Egyptian border with Gaza has been open for terror traffic for three months; and as Hamas has emerged as the most prevalent force in Palestinian politics and society, it is impossible to deny that Sharon's decision to withdraw Israeli forces from Gaza and northern Samaria has vastly empowered Palestinian terrorists. Today the Gaza Strip has become one of the most active and dangerous bases for jihadi terrorism in the world.

And yet, the rapid transformation of Gaza into the most active terror base in the Arab world has not led to calls by the international community, led by Washington for Israel to take the military measures necessary to destroy the emerging threat. To the contrary: The international community, led by the Bush Administration, has greeted Gaza's mutation into what Palestinians refer to as a new Somalia, and what for Israelis and Westerners in general is more comparable to Taliban ruled Afghanistan, with ever more strident demands for continued Israeli appeasement of Palestinian terrorists. The latest testimony to Israel's unprecedented diplomatic weakness in Washington came with President George W. Bush's demand this week that Israel allow Arab residents of Jerusalem to vote in the upcoming Palestinian elections - elections in which Hamas is expected to receive a plurality, if not a majority of votes.

Amid the threat now constituted by Gaza and the rising chaos in Palestinian society generally, three weeks before the Palestinian elections Israel's defense and diplomatic establishments have no answers to give. Israel has no coherent policy to speak of for dealing with the acquisition of Strella anti-aircraft missiles or Katyusha missiles by Palestinian terrorists in Gaza. It has no policy for contending with the fact that Al Qaida has now become an actor in the Palestinian areas and in south Lebanon. It has no effective policy for dealing with the repeated attacks against its vital infrastructures in Ashkelon or with assumption that the Palestinians will soon transfer their newfound capabilities from Gaza to Judea and Samaria. Israel's security brass has no policy for contending with the manifest links between the Iranian regime and Palestinian terror groups.

Our leadership's befuddlement was perhaps most sharply manifested on Wednesday by Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz, who in a public statement laid out Israel's conditions for opening a dialogue with Hamas.

Mofaz's statement was not merely ill-advised. It was completely irrational. Hamas, like the Iranian ayatollahs, is a terror group totally committed to the eradication of Israel. This fact was brought home clearly in an Egyptian television interview given by Mariam Farahat, aka Umm Nidal, the mother of three dead Hamas terrorists on December 21. Farahat is considered a moderate Hamas member and is a Hamas candidate in the Palestinian elections.

In a transcript published by MEMRI, Farahat, who justified the murder of all Israelis everywhere as a legitimate means of jihad, spelled out what "peace" with the Jews means for Hamas. For her, "Peace means the liberation of all of Palestine, from the [Jordan] river to the [Mediterranean] Sea. When this is accomplished - if they want peace, we will be ready. They may live under the banner of the Islamic state. That is the future of Palestine that we are striving towards."

This is Israel's current reality. Our main security challenge on all fronts is to destroy our enemies' ability to match their genocidal anti-Semitism with the means to kill us. And the carrying out of this task can only be accomplished by a leadership that truly understands that we are not to blame for our enemies' hatred and that we can do nothing to mitigate it.

The fact that Arab and Islamic anti-Semitism is met by and large by indifference from the West, which itself is suffering from a milder yet increasingly widespread form of Jew hatred, makes clear the third challenge facing Israel today: ensuring our economic independence. In the history of nations, there has scarcely been a case where the side with the weaker economy prevailed over its enemy in a war of attrition. Israel must ensure its economic vitality and independence in order to guarantee that our defense industries can continue to operate and that our military forces are properly equipped and trained. As well, in light of the rampant anti-Semitism in Western Europe, Israel must be capable of absorbing waves of Jewish immigration from Europe.

Today Israel is in the midst of a painful but successful process of economic liberalization and growth. The political instability that Sharon's departure has induced can threaten this process which is so vital to the future of the country.

In light of the critical challenges that Israel faces today, our current political instability places us in a difficult position. The fact of the matter is that Sharon's Kadima party without Sharon is nothing more than a patchwork of politicians who diverge on so many issues it is impossible to see it fashioning coherent policies. This is a cause for alarm. As well, the fractiousness of the nationalist camp that has been manifested by the Likud ministers' unjustifiable opposition to Binyamin Netanyahu's party leadership, is an additional cause for Israeli weakness at this critical juncture.

One of Sharon's greatest strengths was his ability to form coalitions of people from disparate backgrounds and political camps and move them forward to achieve goals that appeared impossible to attain. Now, with Sharon no longer leading the country, our political leaders must find a way to act in a similar manner. The future of the state depends on their success.

SHARON STILL IN VERY SERIOUS CONDITION- Vital Signs Stable

By Herb Keinon and Gil Hoffman

Jerusalem Post - January 4, 2006Prime Minister Ariel Sharon will remain in an induced coma for at least 24 hours, Professor Shlomo Mor-Yosef, Director-General of Hadassah Ein Kerem Hospital in Jerusalem announced Thursday afternoon.

The prime minister's vital signs were still stable, following his second operation of the day.

"Sharon is under anesthesia and is being ventilated, at least for the next 24 hours," the hospital director said.

Mor-Yosef stressed that the prime minister was still alive, thereby refuting rumors that Sharon had passed away. He promised to notify the public were any changes to occur.

Sharon was transferred to the neuro-surgery intensive care unit following an operation that succeeded in halting cerebral hemmoraghing on Thursday morning. Mor-Yosef announced that a CAT scan had been done and showed ! that the surgery had halted the hemorrhaging and the prime minister's vital signs were stable; Sharon was still in very serious condition, however.

After a six-hour operation to stop cerebral hemorrhaging that continued for most of Wednesday night, the prime minister returned to the operating room early Thursday morning following a CAT scan that revealed additional areas of cerebral bleeding. Several of Sharon's advisors left the emergency room with what journalists described as "poker faces." When pressed for details on his condition, they refused to comment. Mor-Yosef explained that the prime minister was, of course, under general anesthesia and receiving artificial respiration during the procedure.

"The situation is serious," Mor-Yosef stated.

Sharon suffered a massive brain hemorrhage late Wednesday, which caused extensive cerebral bleeding.

Some doctors proffered an opinion that the proc! ess of stopping Sharon's brain hemorrhage was complicated by the blood thinners that the prime minister has been receiving twice daily since his first, minor, stroke some two weeks ago. Hadassah doctors neither confirmed nor denied this theory.

Justice Ministry spokesman Ya'acov Galant said that a prime minister legally remains in his post only as long as he is capable of making decisions. Since Sharon is not conscious after suffering from what doctors termed "a serious stroke," his powers and prerogatives were transferred to his deputy, Finance Minister Ehud Olmert.

Olmert convened a special cabinet meeting on Thursday morning at 9 a.m. in order to brief the ministers on the temporary transfe! r of powers.

The Rabbinate organized a prayer rally service at the Western Wall Wednesday night.

It initially appeared that Sharon's condition was not as severe. According to well-placed sources, there were two deteriorations, the first just prior to the arrival at Hadassah and the second, upon entering the trauma unit.

While on his way to the hospital, Sharon's spokesmen claimed that the prime minister was conscious and able to speak, but had complained that he was suffering from weakness and "felt ill."

The prime minister initially complained of feeling chest pressure and pain. Two Sharon associates said the prime minister was feeling unwell at his Negev ranch, and following a discussion with his personal doctor, decided to be taken to the hospital.

He could have been taken to the closer Soroka Hospital in Beersheba, but it was decided to take him to the further Jerusa! lem hospital, where he was to have a pre-scheduled catheterization on Thursday.

Sharon's son Gilad was reportedly in the car with him, along with a physician, while his other son, Omri Sharon, arrived at the hospital as well.

After suffering a mild stroke 18 days ago, the prime minister had been scheduled to undergo the heart procedure Thursday morning.

However, the procedure was reportedly delayed due to the events of Wednesday evening.

High-ranking Likud sources hinted that the Likud could end up staying in the government if Sharon's health situation turned out to be serious, but a Netanyahu spokesman said the party would not issue any statement other than to wish the prime minister well.

The dramatic downturn in Sharon's health came as Sharon was running for reelection on March 28 at the head of a new centrist party, Kadima. He was enjoying a wide lead in the polls. The party's strength is centered on Sharon himself, and if he were forced to leave the scene, Israel's political scene would be thrown into turmoil.

 [After Sharon:] Israeli Politics Will Revert to Its Past 

by Daniel Pipes

National Post
January 5, 2006
http://www.danielpipes.org/article/3253 

Israel's prime minister, Ariel Sharon, has suffered a massive brain hemorrhage; at the very least, his long political career appears to be over. What does that mean for Israeli politics and for Arab-Israeli relations?

Basically, it signals a return to business as usual.

Since the State of Israel came into existence in 1948, two points of view on relations with the Arabs have dominated its political life, represented by (as they are presently called) Labour on the left and Likud on the right.

Labour argued for greater flexibility and accommodation with the Arabs, Likud called for a tougher stance. Every one of Israel's 11 prime ministers came from the two of them, not a single one came from the plethora of others. The two parties together suffered a long-term decline in popularity but they jointly remained the pivots and kingmakers of Israel electoral life.

Or so they did until six weeks ago. On Nov. 21, Sharon left Likud and formed his own party, called Kadima. He took this radical step in part because his views vis-ŕ-vis the Palestinians had evolved so far from Likud's nationalist policies, as shown by his withdrawal of Israeli forces and civilians from Gaza during mid-2005, that he no longer fit there. Also, he had attained such personal popularity that he attained the stature to found a party in his own image.

His move was exquisitely timed and enormously successful. Instantly, the polls showed Kadima effectively replacing Labour and Likud. The latest survey, conducted by "Dialogue" on Monday and published yesterday, showed Kadima winning 42 seats of the 120 seats in the Knesset, Israel's parliament. Labour followed with 19 seats and Likud trailing behind with a dismal 14.

Kadima's stunning success turned Israeli politics upside-down. The historic warhorses had been so sidelined, one could speculate about Sharon forming a government without even bothering to ally with one or other of them.

Even more astonishing was Sharon's personal authority in Kadima; never had Israel witnessed the emergence of such a strongman. (And rarely do other mature democracies; Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands comes to mind as another exception.) Sharon quickly lured to Kadima prominent Labour, Likud and other politicians who shared little in common other than a willingness to follow his lead.

It was a daredevil, high-flying, net-less, bravura, acrobatic feat, one that would last only so long as Sharon retained his magic touch. Or his health.

I was skeptical of Kadima from the very start, dismissing it just one week after it came into existence as an escapist venture that "will (1) fall about as abruptly as it has arisen and (2) leave behind a meager legacy." If Sharon's career is now over, so is Kadima's. He created it, he ran it, he decided its policies, and none else can now control its fissiparous elements. Without Sharon, Kadima's constituent elements will drift back to their old homes in Labour, Likud, and elsewhere. With a thud, Israeli politics return to normal.

Likud, expected to slip into a dismal third place in the March voting, stands the most to gain from Sharon's exit. Kadima's members came disproportionately from its ranks and now Likud conceivably could, under the forceful leadership of Benjamin Netanyahu, do well enough to remain in power. Likud's prospects look all the brighter given that Labour has just elected a radical and untried new leader, Amir Peretz.

More broadly, the sudden leftward turn of Israeli politics in the wake of Sharon's personal turn to the left will stop and perhaps even be reversed.

Turning to Israeli relations with the Palestinians, Sharon made monumental mistakes in recent months. In particular, the withdrawal of all Israelis from Gaza confirmed for Palestinians that violence works, prompting a barrage of rockets on Israeli territory and an inflammation of the political temperature.

As Israel settles back to a more normal state, with no politician enjoying Sharon's outsized popularity, governmental actions will again come under closer scrutiny. The result is likely to be a less escapist and more realist set of policies toward the Palestinians and perhaps even some forward movement toward a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian war.

_________________________________

Postscript to the National Post article:

A poll carried out for Israel Radio on January 4 – before Sharon's medical emergency – asked "If Ariel Sharon does not head Kadima in the elections, how would you vote?"

The results: 18 for Labor, 16 for Likud, 13 for Kadima.

The vote for other parties is not available.

ISRAEL'S NAPOLEON

 ‘PEACE’ AFTER SHARON  

By Martin Peretz 

Jewish World Review -Jan. 5, 2006 /5 Teves, 5766

http://www.JewishWorldReview.com | "The only thing that's going to solve this," Steven Spielberg told Time magazine, "is rational minds, a lot of sitting and talking until you're blue in the gills." This, I suppose, is what goes for heavy thinking in Hollywood.

Imagine Dreamworks negotiating with Paramount if the lat! ter were continually shooting up the former. So maybe before the Israelis and Palestinians sit down with each other — as they've done innumerable times over the years, at Camp David and Oslo and secret hideouts for very long periods, even producing hopes that many credulous folk took for real — the Palestinians should sit down just with one another and decide whether they truly are a nation and what that nation promises its people. And if my grandmother had wheels, she'd have been a pushcart.

The fact is that, as no-nonsense Golda said many years ago, the Arabs of Palestine don't behave like a nation. No, this doesn't mean they shouldn't have a state. All kinds of rumps have states, and just about every one of these states is represented at the United Nations — where many of them cover for each other over the mortal crimes they inflict on their own populations, like Libya for Sudan, or, for that matter, China for virtually every violato! r of human rights on the planet. Actually, a fictive Palestine has already been counted as a virtual member state for decades, and this has given first Arafat and now his successors the standing to hijack the proceedings of the General Assembly so that much of its business has been devoted to how awfully the Jews treat the Arabs. And, in any case, haven't the Palestinians already declared their independence at least twice?

Now, it's not as if the Palestinians agree as to who represents them, not by a long shot. A significant percentage believes there is nothing to talk about anyway, except possibly the practical details of Israel's dissolution. Of course, the Israeli government negotiates with the Palestinian Authority, mostly under the auspices of Washington, although for some reason Russia, the European Union, and even the United Nations are occasionally made to feel that they are also playing hostess. But the P.A. has very little authority, and it seems sometimes t! o revel in its helplessness, likely as an explanation of why it can't enforce the few arrangements to which it has agreed. It's not surprising that, in such a circumstance, the peace-process interlopers are always looking for someone else to jump start the process.

For years, the liberal professoriat in America had anointed Edward Said in the role. But he turned out to be a yarn spinner: His much retailed personal history of exile was intricately fabricated. Then there was Hanan Ashrawi who has plumb disappeared, more or less, with the death of Peter Jennings and the disappearance of Ted Koppel.

All through this period, there was also the truly upright personage of Sari Nusseibeh, made to compete with these two unguent-incendiaries. Nusseibeh is, after all, a serious intellectual (B.A. from Christ Church, Oxford; PhD from Harvard) and a genuinely moderate man. He shows up at whatever meeting is convened to advance the peace process with Israel. Alas, he carrie! s little weight among his own. He knows this himself, the point having been amply made when he was beaten up at his own Bir Zeit University during the first intifada.

So, in the year when the Palestinians were finally sorting out what happens after Yasir Arafat, Nusseibeh was my neighbor in Cambridge crafting a memoir with some trusted scribe at the Radcliffe Institute. His alleged sins are not all his own. His family was widely respected through the ages, which is why its members have been custodians of the keys to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre since the twelfth century. They were especially trusted by the British and the Jordanians, in itself transgressions according to the other dominant locals, especially the Husseinis — from which tree both Arafat and Haj Amin, the notorious Hitler ally installed by the Crown's ever-accommodating Jewish High Commissioner as the first "Grand" Mufti of Jerusalem, hailed. The Husseinis still carry enormous weight among th! e clans and tribes of Palestine, sort of capo de capo.

You don't hear much about these bewildering social formations until a long-festering inter-family (or intra-family) feud suddenly erupts and blood is shed, as it has recently with special regularity in Gaza. Journalists and academics somehow think it patronizing to recognize these antiquarian kinship groups with their raw emotions as political actors when their rhetoric strains so pompously to modernity. It would be especially insulting since their Jewish antagonists are the quintessential carriers of progress in the Middle East, those damned Zionists with their advanced science-based economy, independent judiciary, free press, hi-tech military in which individual soldiers still take responsibility and command respect, and promotion in the ranks by competence and ingenuity in the defense activities of the state.

But political allegiances among the Palestinians are cemented by just those more primitive ! ; — which is to say, primal — ties. G-d only knows why you can talk about these with regard to Sicily but not when it comes to Palestine. In any case, the truth is that Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Al Aqsa, the Popular Resistance Committee, and other armed gangs and ganglets of the national movement, such as it is, are each defined partly by ideology, partly by bloodlines. A whole village may vote for the headman's pick, which until he tells you is anyone's guess.

The withdrawal from Gaza by Israel was supposed to be a test. OK, not of everything but of something. Take your pick. That the hudna (ceasefire) would hold. It didn't. Islamic Jihad hadn't even signed on to the contract. It carried out several successful terrorist attacks and day in, day out launched rockets from Gaza deeper and deeper into pre-1967 Israel. But, in a way, even more serious is the fact that the most protracted war by Qassam projectiles was waged by armed elements of Fatah, ! the P.A. president's own political party.

What about security undertakings with regard to Gaza's border with Egypt?

Again a failure.

Weapons and terrorists have surged, not seeped, through the frontier that is also "guaranteed" by various European well-wishers. Is there elemental public order on the streets?

Not at all.

What about the assumption that there would be sufficient pressure from the Palestinian public for the P.A. to feel obliged to take control of the streets? Not enough pressure or not enough will to take control. The P.A. is still the most heavily armed force in Gaza. No matter: Militias battle police, police battle other police, gangs brawl with other gangs; there are revenge killings, aimless killings, kidnappings, bombings, clubbings, mutilations, some pointless, some unmistakably pointed. Chaos rules in Gaza, utter mayhem. "It appears as if Gaza has degenerated into anarchy," explains CNN.

There has ! been a steady outflow of pro-Palestinian NGO personnel from the Strip, some out of panic, some from a realization that the Palestinian revolution, so called, is animated by bloodlust. According to The Times of London, one British aid worker who was recently held hostage by gunmen for three days told her kidnappers, "I came to work with these people and I feel like I've been stabbed in the back." Is this the future of Palestine?

The present P.A. seems desperately to want to find an excuse for postponing parliamentary elections in Gaza and the West Bank. It may have found a pretext in Israel's stated refusal to allow voting to take place in Jerusalem since Hamas, which fundamentally rejects the existence of Israel, would be on the ballot. But the real reason is that the Abbas crowd fears that it will be utterly upended by Hamas.

Another reason is that, even if Fatah wins, the habitually corrupt present leadership will be demoted by the younger (not so young, ac! tually) cadres who forced their way on to the party's slate by threatening to run their own if they were not given favored spots. At the head of their list is Marwan Barghouti, serving five life sentences in an Israeli prison for as many acts of mass murder.

How has all this registered in Israel? The fact is that almost no one any longer believes in a negotiated peace with the Palestinians. Not because sensible and humane Israelis can't imagine a fair divide of the land between the river and the sea. But because Gaza has truly shown them that there are — let's be perfectly frank — no Palestinians with whom to treat. Oh, Israel will bargain on this point and that, so far as George Bush insists and pushes Jerusalem. So, even when Palestinian rockets slam into Israeli towns and villages and army bases, the Sharon government will agree to some formula for Palestinian travel between Gaza and the West Bank, as it is about to do. But the government knows! that, whatever security assurances are given for this unprecedented passage, they will not hold — as not a single security assurance from the Palestinians has ever held. There is no dispute: This is the record.

The unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza was a wager on the sanity of the Palestinian polity. The betters lost. I still believe that it was a wise move, but for purely Israeli reasons. Still, Israel may find that its forces will have to re-enter Gaza to deliver punishing blows to the Palestinians who cannot win but hold their own population hostage to their bellicosity. It even may be that Israel will decide to pit the local inhabitants against their captors, which it could do by turning off — for an hour or many hours a day — the electricity it has continued to provide to Gaza despite unrelenting provocation. It is remarkable that Israel has resisted so long taking what must be a very tempting step.

All this has consequences for the West Bank. Sooner or later, and particularly if there is a withdrawal from the West Bank and the Jordan Valley, rockets and missiles will be as common there as they are in Gaza and Lebanon. Already, Al Qaeda has claimed (and Israeli intelligence has confirmed) that it was responsible for at least one rocket attack on Israel proper. The Hezbollah tie to Iran, with its imminent nuclear designs and delirious president, only exacerbates a very precarious situation. In any case, those who casually promote the notion that Israel should disengage from here, there, nearly everywhere close to the 1949 lines are proposing that the Jewish state commit suicide. Virtually the entire country, including Ben Gurion Airport, would be vulnerable to even simple weaponry. I'm afraid that sitting and talking until you're blue in the gills won't quite do.

Fortunately, the Israeli population is as undeceived as its present government — and its future one, too.

POST SHARON ERA - Program Over Personality

by Aaron Lerner

Make no mistake about it: the overwhelming majority of Israelis oppose unilateral withdrawals (less than twenty percent supported more "unilateral disengagements" in a poll conducted last month by Mina Tzemah for the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs's Defensible Borders Project).

But in a personality rather than policy-driven decision, many of the very same people who tell pollsters that they oppose the post-election retreats Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has in mind also say they would vote for a Sharon-led Kadima Party.

And there was an underlying logic to this choice.

After all, Israel's survival isn't just based on good policy - it can also depend on critical crisis management.

It is 4:00 AM and Syria has suddenly advanced a battalion towards the border. Who do you want to be woken up to handle the crisis? Ariel Sharon, Binyamin Netanyahu or Amir Peretz?

There were a lot of Israelis who thought Sharon's policies were madness but
still would prefer Sharon at a fateful 4:00 AM over the others.

But with Sharon effectively off the Kadima list there simply isn't anyone there who enjoys this very special public confidence.

Kadima can be expected to appeal to voters to honor "Sharon's legacy" on election day, but it's not a particularly powerful appeal. Especially when the "legacy" is a policy the public opposes.

KADIMA LEADERSHIP STILL UNDETERMINED

The Kadima Party, whose list was expected to be compiled by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, has been thrown into tumult following its leader's critical health condition and the low probability of his return to political life.

The party was widely seen as one in which Sharon made all the important decisions, and his absence left its future unclear.

On the other hand, Minister without Portfolio Tzahi Hanegbi said that the hierarchical structure with one man clearly above the rest could be viewed as an advantage. He said that Kadima was a nascent party and that the mechanism of choosing a leader has net yet been fully established.

He noted that the structure of the party left it free of infighting or dependence on a central committee.

Transportation Minister Meir Sheetrit stated unequivocably that, assuming Sharon does not return to politics, Kadima should support Acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert as its candidate for prime ministry in the upcoming elections in March.

In response to a specific question asking whether the acting prime minister should be supported even if he was not expected to gain as many Knesset seats as other candidates, Sheetrit answered that Olmert's initial ranking may not be very high, but he would become more popular with passing time.

"The position forges the man," Sheetrit concluded.

The comments he issued contradicted earlier reports that Sheetrit called on the Kadima Party council to hold a meeting within 48 hours "in order to decide who will lead the party in the upcoming elections."

The long time Sharon loyalist went on to say that a system needed to be implemented to finalize the party's Knesset list. The leading candidates to inherit the leadership of Kadima, according to Sheetrit, were Acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Tzipi Livni, Shaul Mofaz and himself. He speculated that the chances of Shimon Peres leading Kadima were very slim.

Former Labor MK Haim Ramon, now in Kadima, said Thursday evening, "We can prove that even though Sharon won't lead the party in the upcoming elections, we can still win, because we have we have a message that the public is yearning for."

Earlier Thursday, in response to Sheetrit's comments, Kadima MK Roni Bar-On said that the party needed to unite behind Olmert's leadership and assist him in running the country.

"Calm and responsibility are what is needed now to run the country. All other things can wait for now," he said.

In a security briefing, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz granted unequivocal support for the acting prime minister. He vowed that he and the security forces which are subordinated to him, would assist Olmert in any way they could.

Mofaz insisted that the IDF does not need to redeploy in a different manner following the sensitive situation caused by Sharon's probable departure from politics.

The March election could be delayed if 80 of 120 lawmakers support such a move, but a postponement appears unlikely.

Parliament Speaker Reuven Rivlin ruled out any delay. "Arik Sharon ... would have said we have to show leadership stability and of course hold elections on the date selected," Rivlin told Israel's Army Radio.

Upon hearing the news of Sharon's medical situation last night, Likud Chairman Binyamin Netanyahu said that he was joining the rest of the country in prayer for the health of Sharon.

"I wish the medical staff success in their mission," he said.

The Labor party issued a statement that read, "The Labor party, together with the people of Israel pray for the recovery of Ariel Sharon."

Shas Chairman Eli Yishai said that party mentor Rabbi Ovadia Yosef urged all Jews to pray for the recovery of the prime minister.

"I am not sure I believe in prayers, but I certainly hope Sharon would make it through the operation, recover, return to himself and resume his duties," Meretz-Yahad MK Yossi Sarid said.

According to Sarid, "I don't think that the elections would be delayed, and I don't believe there is legal precedent, for delaying elections if someone - even a central figure - is incapacitated."

ISRAEL DOES NOT YET UNDERSTAND THE RULES OF THE GAME IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Needed: Strong Deterrence
by Guy Bechor

YnetNews.com - January 1, 2006

The IDF's reaction was measured, not "from the gut", said one senior officer about the army's response to the latest barrage of Katyusha rockets on northern Israel. In doing so, he clarified the rules of the renewed game on the northern border: Israel will once again accept being targeted by rocket fire. The "measured" reaction proves once again just how far Israel really is from understanding the rules that govern this region.

When we look at the ceremonial, tribal clothing worn by leaders of the Persian Gulf monarchies, one cannot help but notice a large, sharp weapon demonstratively attached to the hip. This weapon is called a jineta, and it serves to teach us an important lesson about deterrence in the Middle East.

Threaten, don't attack

For hundreds of years Bedouin tribes fought one another, until over time they established non-warfare rules: One may threaten, but not attack. This is the meaning of the jineta: By displaying the weapon, a leader is understood to be warning his enemies: I can kill you – but I won't.

These rules of warfare created the template for deterrence in the Arab Middle East: Threats are okay, but opening fire will carry a heavy price. The goal is to convince the other side that he will suffer heavy, heavy losses should he choose to attack.

For example, when the Syrian-supported Kurdish underground went too far in its fight against Turkey, the Turkish army responded with a mass troop concentration on the Syrian border and threatened to invade. Syria backed down immediately and returned to threatening Lebanon, much as Iran does today by warning Israel of a strong reaction should Israel attack Iran's nuclear facilities.

Shying away from confrontation

The jineta must be seen; That's why they are so common amongst armies in this region, as are threats. Israel takes the warnings and considers them to be an inferior mode of behavior, but in the Middle East deterrence has always been an important tool for preventing violence and creating the political breadth necessary for stopping deterioration.

This is the reason strong Israel shies away from confrontation, because behind the Arab threats there is no action: The goal, amongst other things, is to create a political base for non-warfare.

Since its inception, Israel has never successfully created a believable deterrent mechanism, and if any such deterrent has existed, it was not due to any Israeli planning. Instead of strongly clarifying the price the other side would pay as a result of attacking Israel, Israel has stuttered, condemned and showed itself to be weak

Reacting to the (unfounded) threats by Saddam Hussein, Israel cowered in sealed rooms with absurd masks. In Lebanon, Israel created a security zone, as it did this week in Gaza. The denunciations show the enemy that he is welcome to continue attacking.

Creating effective deterrent requires showing the jineta, as well as being prepared to "get one's hands dirty" if the threat does not dissipate: One large-scale maneuver that will leave the enemy deterred for years to come. "Measured" reactions will always bring death and destruction to the residents of this country.

 Guy Bechor is a regular commentator on Mid-East affairs for Israel's leading newspaper Yedioth

Ahronoth

The article and excerpt below were originally written as editorials for 1995 issues of THE MACCABEAN.

[An excerpt]

DETERRENCE OR DHIMMIZATION

Which Should Israel Choose?

By Bernard J. Shapiro

Back in 1965, in a small meeting room in Tel Aviv, former Defense Minister Moshe Dayan gave a pep talk to a group of RAFI (Rishimat Poalai Israel) volunteers, myself included. At that time, RAFI, a breakaway faction of the Mapai Party, included su! ch notables as former Prime Minister David Ben Gurion and former Defense Minister Shimon Peres. Peres and Dayan had been considered the "hawks" of Mapai and it was no accident that in the 1965 election they supported a strong defense and security policy.

Dayan was always interesting to listen to, but this talk was something special and we paid attention to every word. "The essence of Israel's security in this region (Middle East) is deterrence," he said. "When we formed the State in 1948-9, we were very weak. The Arab States had planes, tanks, heavy artillery and many more soldiers than us. We had very little heavy military equipment. In the period 1949-55, we absorbed almost a million immigrants. Tent cities sprung up all over the country. We were totally disorganized. Had the Arabs mounted another major invasion, we could have lost. We devised a solution to this problem. It was deterrence. Think about being lost in a forest and surrounded by hostile animals. If you light a torch, boldly approach them showing no fear -- they will retreat. But, if you show fear -- they will attack and you are lost. We used this principle to save Israel during those early years. Every time we were attacked, we retaliated ten fold. We showed daring and penetrated deep within their borders to attack our targets. We were fearless, brave, and even a bit bloodthirsty. You know the result. The Arabs were afraid and never attacked. Deterrence worked. By 1956 when we invaded Sinai, the Israel Defense Force was not just strong, it was invincible."

The story above was not told just for nostalgia. The lesson is extremely important for the survival of Israel today.

Unfortunately Israelis are daily witnessing the consequences of seven years of declining deterrence vis a vis its Arab population. In 1987, the intifada presented Israel with a new challenge. It was a new kind of war, but with the same aim of driving the Israelis out of their country. The Israelis fought the intifada with many handicaps, not the least of which were their own rules of conduct. Israeli soldiers failed to cope with attacks by teenage Arab boys. In the course of several years, the Arabs learned that the soldiers would not aggressively retaliate for their attacks. They became emboldened.

The Jews living in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza showed great fortitude, enduring thousands of attacks and still tripling their numbers. The serious security failure developed as Arabs became accustomed to attacking Jews and Israeli soldiers. By trying to remain humane in the face of massive attacks, Israel emboldened the Arabs to more and more attacks. Throwing concrete boulders, Molotov cocktails, and then using firearms at Israelis became the norm of behavior among the Arabs. The Israeli government allowed its citizens to be attacked solely because they were Jews. In no other country of the world would such a policy be tolerated. Just two weeks ago a reserve officer of the Israel Defense Forces made a wrong turn and ended up in the center of Ramallah, a Arab city. He was immediately attacked by a vicious mob of Arabs, murder in their eyes, who almost beat him to death. Deterrence had vanished.

While the Jews may not have been afraid like the man in the forest, the affect of multiple restrictions on the Israeli right of self defense had the same result. That result was to increase the bloodlust of the Arab population and to multiply the Jewish casualties.

TIME FOR ISRAEL AND AMERICA TO
END THEIR POLICY OF RESTRAINT 

By Bernard J. Shapiro 

"He who is merciful when he should be cruel will in the end be cruel when he should be merciful."...Midrash Samuel (Jewish rabbinic text from early Middle Ages)

From the very early days of the Haganah and continuing with the emerging Israel Defense Forces (IDF), there was a policy of self-restraint or havlagah. This policy mandated that defenders could only return fire, hold their positions, and never to engage in counter-terror. This policy was based on the false premise that the Arab masses did not support the war against the Yishuv (the Jewish population before independence) and then the State of Israel and would be brought into the conflict if Israeli forces were too aggressive. There were some good and practical reasons for restraint in the early days. There was legitimate f! ear that the British would cut off immigration if the Jews were to go on the offensive against the Arabs. Havlagah was essentially a Haganah (Labor/Socialist) policy and many supporters of Jabotinsky's Revisionist Zionist movement broke off from them to form fighting units (Irgun Zvai Leumi and Stern) unrestrained by that policy.

The modern IDF was dominated by Labor and quickly adopted the policy of restraint and the concept of