Published by The Freeman Center

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Political Analysis and Commentary
on Israeli and Jewish Affairs

"For Zion's sake I shall not hold my peace, And for Jerusalem's sake I shall not rest."



 

 

Freeman Center Note: The best defense is a good offense. Rather than defend -attack and keep attacking until the enemy is annihilated!

 

Lt. Gen. Obering: Iron Dome’s Lessons Learned  

By Mark Langfan

Arutz Sheva

28 February, 2013 


Lt. Gen. Obering

Lt. Gen. Obering / U.S. Air Force website

In a wide-ranging power-point analysis briefing given to the National Security Roundtable this week, US Lt. Gen. Henry “Trey” Obering (Ret.), who led the US Missile Defense Agency during the mission-critical years of Iron Dome from 2004 to 2009, boiled down the “Lessons Learned” of Iron Dome experience to 5 keys.
 
He set the stage for his Lessons Learned analysis by asking the audience “What would America have done if 25% of its population or 50,000,000 Americans where under Grad rocket assault by a bunch of Islamist Terrorists?” (The full PowerPoint or just the “Lessons Learned” slide are available for viewing). 

Gen. Trey Obering’s five keys for success were: 

1. Mission Vision

He said President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) wasn’t a sci-fi fantasy, but an out-of-the-box vision of where the future of defense should be. Israeli defense officials, like Yitzhak Rabin, shared President Reagan’s vision from early on. This tradition continued with Israeli defense planners like Brig. Gen. Daniel Gold and missile defense developers like Arieh Herzog. This vision and collaboration resulted in the critically important missile defense programs both nations have today. (For a riveting account of Iron Dome’s early hurdles see the Wall Street Journal article Israel's Iron Dome Defense Battled to Get Off Ground). 

2. Perseverance through Technical Difficulty 

Gen. Obering explained that with any new technology there will be test failures. Today’s effective US sea-based and land-based interceptors suffered early failures, then strings of successes. Likewise, the Arrow program failed in its early flights, then succeeded in a series of intercepts. Israel funded the Iron Dome program through the earliest stages despite US military planners' doubts and set-backs. 

3. Courage of Leadership 

Iron Dome and Arrow both faced withering attacks from naysayers like the MIT Professor Theodore Postol who testified that the “Patriot’s intercept rate could be much lower than ten percent and maybe even zero,” and the Jaffe Center’s missile defense program critic Reuven Pedatzur who, as recently as 2010, with supreme confidence stated “The Iron Dome is all a scam.” See The Jerusalem Post article "Iron Dome doesn’t answer threats".

But heroes, like Israeli Brig. Gen Daniel Gold, stayed the course, stuck to their knitting, and got the job done. 

Obering quipped, “For every MIT professor who said ‘It couldn’t be done,’ I had 10 MIT young geniuses who were making the scientifically impossible, possible.” 

4. Program Management 

Gen. Obering emphasized that for a technologically game-changing defense program to be successful, the managers had to have “freedom of maneuver” in the allocation of resources to meet the fast moving day-to-day challenges. He explained that unlike usual defense programs, he had relief from the classic acquisition regulations and directives. Likewise, Gen. Gold established programmatic freedom to act in the Israeli program. The streamlined program oversight was the key to success. 

5. Policy Considerations 

Gen. Obering stated that the Iron Dome, and defensive systems like it, are game-changers that have to be pursued with supreme effort. He explained that the naysayers just looked at the “cost” in the cost/benefit analysis. He clarified that as a “policy consideration” defense rockets “cost” is not just measured in money, and that it is critically important to factor in the benefit of not having civilian assets destroyed – or of having to reinvade the territory with the consequent loss of Israeli soldiers lives – and of enabling the defenders time and space to react appropriately. Also, there is the missile defense deterrence factor in that the enemy has to effect a dramatically greater offensive attack profile before it attacks in the first place. Therefore, the risk/reward ratio for the enemy attacker is so changed that it is dramatically less likely to attack in the first place. 

During the Q & A, Gen. Obering wowed the crowd with a live action video of an actual US missile defense early “kill” against an errant satellite.

Given the profound military and policy analysis of Gen. Obering and his critical hands-on assistance to Iron Dome project at its most sensitive and problematic stages, it was clear that Gen. Obering is not only an American true hero, but an Israeli hero as well.

 


Iron Dome: Has the Euphoria Been Justified?

by Prof. Avi Kober

BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 199

25 February, 2013

http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/docs/perspectives199.pdf

 

Iron Dome is good news only on one condition: that the political and military echelons in Israel acknowledge its limitations.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Early praise for the Iron Dome system may be deserved. 
Yet Israel’s deterrence capability has not been enhanced, and the Iron Dome 
may initiate an arms race among Israel’s enemies to try and defeat it. 
Moreover, its success lowers the chance for Israeli punitive actions that 
are needed for deterrence.

In early February 2013 the IDF deployed the Iron Dome anti-rocket system in 
northern Israel, to fend off potential threats in the area. This system is 
truly an impressive technological achievement. It was evaluated as an asset, 
thanks to the system’s ability not only to save lives but to also afford 
greater freedom of choice for the political and military echelons regarding 
when and how to respond to attacks on the home front.

Praise for Iron Dome

Even initial critics have admitted that the system’s ability to intercept 
some 90 percent of the missiles fired at Israel during Operation Pillar of 
Defense in Gaza in November 2012 – which would have otherwise hit populated 
areas – is beyond the developers’ expectations and a significant 
contribution to Israeli defensive capabilities. The system saved lives of 
civilians and troops, which makes it attractive to Israel’s casualty-averse 
society, particularly in conflicts that do not endanger Israel’s most vital 
security interests, let alone its survival. Its high cost is still lower 
than the damage inflicted by Palestinian or Hizballah rockets on property, 
let alone the cost in human loss. Each intercepting Iron Dome missile costs 
approximately $50,000, whereas the damage inflicted by one rocket on Israeli 
targets is much higher, estimated at around $750,000 for one “average” 
middle age Israeli killed or $190,000 for damage caused to property. The 
United States’ readiness to assist Israel in funding the system means that 
its burden on Israel’s security budget is, and will be, tolerable.

Criticism of Iron Dome

A handful of strategic experts have spoiled the euphoria, raising some 
doubts regarding the system’s efficiency. For example, some claim that the 
system can hardly cope with thousands of enemy rockets, particularly with 
the challenge of multiple rocket launchers, and that it has from the start 
been technologically unable to defend the communities located close to the 
Gazan border; such a defense would require other systems, like laser 
interceptors. They also argue that the effect of Iron Dome is limited 
because some rockets manage to penetrate the system.

But there are additional negative aspects of the system that should be 
considered. A major problem is created by the fact that it does not produce 
deterrence. Iron Dome is unable to destroy the appetite of the Palestinians 
and Hizballah to attack Israel, as it contributes neither to 
deterrence-by-denial nor to deterrence-by-punishment. In the former type of 
deterrence the attacker is expected to pay a high price by being denied by 
the adversary’s defensive deployment, while in the latter type of deterrence 
the attacker is expected to pay a high price as a result of the painful 
offensive retaliation of the adversary. Currently, Iron Dome can do no more 
than frustrate the challenger, not deter him. Furthermore, the tacit, often 
unintended message conveyed by deploying defensive systems – that the 
challenged side is ready to tolerate attacks on its home front – has put 
Israel in a position of weakness against an enemy that is ready to kill and 
be killed, and has negatively affected its deterrent posture.

It is also argued that Israeli towns will not be held hostage by Palestinian 
groups. This is only partially true. The sirens and the 10 percent of the 
rockets that will penetrate Iron Dome-covered areas – and even rockets that 
were intentionally not intercepted because the system’s radar had calculated 
that they were going to fall in empty areas – have a demoralizing effect. 
The trickle of rockets still forces Israeli citizens to seek shelter during 
rocket attacks and disrupt routine life. Even a more complete system will 
not allow the maintenance of a peacetime routine, because the debris of the 
intercepted rockets, as well as that of the interceptors themselves, will be 
a danger to people in open areas. Furthermore, due to Israel’s ability to 
sustain rocket attacks thanks to a low casualty rate, border communities are 
doomed to suffer from prolonged conflict and be held hostage by Hamas and 
Hizballah.

The argument that the system provides freedom to the political leadership 
and the IDF time to prepare for offensive actions is problematic, too. It 
can easily be presented the other way around: a lack of casualties among 
Israeli civilians might make any large-scale military punishment operation 
almost illegitimate, both externally and domestically.

Finally, the problem of Iron Dome to handle large quantities of rockets 
launched against Israel serves as a catalyst for an arms race, as it 
encourages challengers to acquire large quantities of missiles and rockets 
to penetrate the defensive cover. It was for this reason that during the 
Cold War the superpowers agreed to avoid deployment of such systems, save 
for in very limited areas. Israel’s tiny size does justify such deployment, 
but this cannot change the fact that Israel’s enemies have long ago 
identified Israel’s active defensive weaknesses and have been arming 
massively for this purpose, a process that challenges Iron Dome and other 
active defense systems.

Conclusion

The most positive aspect of Iron Dome is the system’s life-saving 
capability, and the feeling among Israeli citizens that they are now better 
protected, which should not be underestimated. Some doubts exist regarding 
the system’s benefits, though. The system does not provide protection for 
those living close to the border, and hardly frees the home front from 
disruption of daily life and demoralization. In addition, it is 
counterproductive as far as deterrence is concerned, and might create the 
impression that Israel is prepared to tolerate enemy rocket attacks. 
Furthermore, Iron Dome might tie Israeli hands rather than afford freedom of 
choice and action as far as retaliation is concerned, and could weaken 
Israel’s traditional offensive approach. Finally, the system might stimulate 
a quantitative arms race as a result of an Arab attempt to take advantage of 
Iron Dome’s difficulties in coping with a large quantity of rockets.

Former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert rightly said that “we will not protect 
ourselves to death.” Iron Dome is good news only on one condition: that the 
political and military echelons in Israel acknowledge its limitations.

* * * * * * *
Prof. Avi Kober is an associate professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan 
University and a senior research associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for 
Strategic Studies.


BESA Center Perspectives Papers are published through the generosity
of the Greg Rosshandler Family 


IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis
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